CAJ | 학술논문

已有文献考察了地方国企发展金字塔结构的动机,但并未关注这种动机发展的金字塔结构对资源配置及资源使用效率的影响。本文以2001-2012年A股主板地方国有上市公司为样本,实证发现在中国国有产权无法直接转让的背景下,金字塔层级因放权而减弱了政府控制,政府对地方国企的＂支持之手＂和＂掠夺之手＂均被削弱。具体表现为,地方国企金字塔层级越多,长期贷款相对越少;这种长期贷款的减少程度随着金融市场的发展而降低;但长期贷款使用效率却相对越高。这些结论在考虑了内生性和银行监督、企业贷款需求两种竞争性解释之后仍然成立。进一步研究发现,地方国企金字塔层级降低长期贷款以及提升长期贷款使用效率的影响主要体现在市县级国企中,在省级国企中并不明显。本文以中国国有产权下基于放权的金字塔结构的资源配置为研究对象,丰富了世界范围内金字塔结构的相关研究,其结论对认识中国地方国企金字塔结构和国企改革有参考价值。
이유문헌고찰료지방국기발전금자탑결구적동궤,단병미관주저충동궤발전적금자탑결구대자원배치급자원사용효솔적영향。본문이2001-2012년A고주판지방국유상시공사위양본,실증발현재중국국유산권무법직접전양적배경하,금자탑층급인방권이감약료정부공제,정부대지방국기적＂지지지수＂화＂략탈지수＂균피삭약。구체표현위,지방국기금자탑층급월다,장기대관상대월소;저충장기대관적감소정도수착금융시장적발전이강저;단장기대관사용효솔각상대월고。저사결론재고필료내생성화은행감독、기업대관수구량충경쟁성해석지후잉연성립。진일보연구발현,지방국기금자탑층급강저장기대관이급제승장기대관사용효솔적영향주요체현재시현급국기중,재성급국기중병불명현。본문이중국국유산권하기우방권적금자탑결구적자원배치위연구대상,봉부료세계범위내금자탑결구적상관연구,기결론대인식중국지방국기금자탑결구화국기개혁유삼고개치。
Extant literature have already revealed local government＇s motivation of developing pyramidal layers in state-owned listed firms. However, the efficiency of resource allocation under such shareholding structure has not been tested yet. Under the unique institutional background that China＇s state-owned shares cannot be directly trade in the stock market, we find that the pyramidal layers inherently reduce the government＇s controlling power in firms by using the data of Chinese listed firms from the year 2001 to 2012 as our sample. Further, we find the decreasing of such controlling power also results in the effect of both government＇s ＂helping-hand＂ and ＂grabbing hand＂ diminishing gradually. Also, We find that the more pyramid layers that firms have, the less long-term loans that SOEs can acquire. Moreover, the decreasing amount of long-term loans in listed firms depends on the development of local financial market where firms located. Also, the result suggests that the long-term loans are used in a more efficient way along with firms＇ pyramidal layers increasing. Those results are still robust after we consider the endogenous problem. In the further analysis, we find the result dose not hold in non-SOEs, and pyramidal layers can significantly reduce firms＇ demand for short-term borrowing but increase the capital cost, which rule out alternative explanations such as agency cost hypothesis and loan-demanding explain. Last, in the sub-sample robustness tests, we find the effect that pyramidal layers cast on the amount and the efficiency of long-term loans is primarily constrained in municipal SOEs, rather than provincial SOEs. Overall, our finding contributes to the literature related to the resource allocation efficiency under SOEs＇ pyramidal layers, provides the solid and robust empirical evidence in China, and enriches the research related to pyramidal structure in the world. From a more practical perspective, our paper forges a better understanding about the local SOEs＇ pyramidal structures in China and put forward a series of policy suggestions for SOE reform, which may sheds some light on China＇s ongoing SOE reform activities.