CAJ | 학술논문

本文选取2009-2012年沪深两市创业板和中小板上市公司为研究对象,研究了创业投资参与对民营和国有企业高管薪酬契约的影响。实证研究发现：（1）创业投资能够显著改变民营企业高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性,但是创业投资并没有显著改变国有企业高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性;（2）对民营企业而言,创业投资参与降低了高管薪酬与会计业绩之间的敏感性,但是提高了高管薪酬与市场业绩敏感性。实证结果表明,创业投资在民营企业高管薪酬制定过程中发挥了作用,创业投资更加重视市场业绩在高管薪酬契约中的作用;创业投资对国有企业高管薪酬契约影响非常有限;创业投资参与民营和国有企业的动机可能存在差异。
본문선취2009-2012년호심량시창업판화중소판상시공사위연구대상,연구료창업투자삼여대민영화국유기업고관신수계약적영향。실증연구발현：（1）창업투자능구현저개변민영기업고관신수여업적적민감성,단시창업투자병몰유현저개변국유기업고관신수여업적적민감성;（2）대민영기업이언,창업투자삼여강저료고관신수여회계업적지간적민감성,단시제고료고관신수여시장업적민감성。실증결과표명,창업투자재민영기업고관신수제정과정중발휘료작용,창업투자경가중시시장업적재고관신수계약중적작용;창업투자대국유기업고관신수계약영향비상유한;창업투자삼여민영화국유기업적동궤가능존재차이。
In more recent years, venture capital has achieved rapid development and made great progress in China. However, whether venture capital could play an effective governance role in China is still an open question. Using a sample of IPO listed companies from Small-Medium board and Chi Next from 2009 to 2012, this article empirically examines how venture capital affects the compensation contract design of the senior executives in both Chinese state owned and private enterprises. The main findings of this study are as follows： First, venture capital in China can significantly enhance the sensitivity of the relationship between senior executives＇ pay and performance in private enterprise, but it cannot significantly improve the sensitivity of the relationship between the sensitivity between senior executives＇ pay and performance in state owned enterprise, which indicates that it is different in the mechanism that determine the compensation contract of senior executives of state owned enterprise and private enterprise; Second, for private enterprise, venture capital decreases the sensitivity of the relationship between senior executives＇ pay and accounting performance, but it increases the sensitivity of the relationship between senior executives＇ pay and market performance. These empirical results indicate that（1） from the perspective of the compensation contract design of the senior executives, venture capital in China plays a better governance role in private enterprises than in that of state owned enterprises, suggesting that venture capital in China may have different motivation to invest in state owned enterprises and private enterprises;（2） venture capital in China emphasizes more on market performance than accounting performance, which is determined by the characteristics of investment of venture capital that the main target is achieving capital gain. Based on the above findings, this paper provides some important policy suggestions and management implications. It also enriches literature about venture capital in China and its governance role.