国际贸易问题
國際貿易問題
국제무역문제
Journal of International Trade
2015年
5期
166~176
,共null页
商业信贷 出口选择 出口强度 银行信贷
商業信貸 齣口選擇 齣口彊度 銀行信貸
상업신대 출구선택 출구강도 은행신대
Trade credit; Export choice; Export strength; Bank credit
本文研究商业信贷对企业出口的影响及机制,从商业信贷角度解释中国企业在银行信贷约束下创造出口增长奇迹的现象。文章首先将商业信贷引入异质企业出口模型,证明在银行信贷约束下,商业信贷直接和间接地促进企业出口,促进机制是直接缓解企业出口可变成本融资约束和促进银行信贷进而间接降低企业出口融资成本。文章接着运用中国制造业大样本企业面板数据,采用Heckman选择模型,从出口概率和出口强度方面进行实证分析,验证了上述理论分析,发现商业信贷对企业出口概率和出口强度的促进作用在高竞争性行业比低竞争性行业明显,在民营企业比其他企业明显,但是商业信贷对国有企业和集体企业的出口影响不显著。
本文研究商業信貸對企業齣口的影響及機製,從商業信貸角度解釋中國企業在銀行信貸約束下創造齣口增長奇跡的現象。文章首先將商業信貸引入異質企業齣口模型,證明在銀行信貸約束下,商業信貸直接和間接地促進企業齣口,促進機製是直接緩解企業齣口可變成本融資約束和促進銀行信貸進而間接降低企業齣口融資成本。文章接著運用中國製造業大樣本企業麵闆數據,採用Heckman選擇模型,從齣口概率和齣口彊度方麵進行實證分析,驗證瞭上述理論分析,髮現商業信貸對企業齣口概率和齣口彊度的促進作用在高競爭性行業比低競爭性行業明顯,在民營企業比其他企業明顯,但是商業信貸對國有企業和集體企業的齣口影響不顯著。
본문연구상업신대대기업출구적영향급궤제,종상업신대각도해석중국기업재은행신대약속하창조출구증장기적적현상。문장수선장상업신대인입이질기업출구모형,증명재은행신대약속하,상업신대직접화간접지촉진기업출구,촉진궤제시직접완해기업출구가변성본융자약속화촉진은행신대진이간접강저기업출구융자성본。문장접착운용중국제조업대양본기업면판수거,채용Heckman선택모형,종출구개솔화출구강도방면진행실증분석,험증료상술이론분석,발현상업신대대기업출구개솔화출구강도적촉진작용재고경쟁성행업비저경쟁성행업명현,재민영기업비기타기업명현,단시상업신대대국유기업화집체기업적출구영향불현저。
This paper studies the effect and mechanism of trade credit on firms' export and explains the export growth miracle of Chinese firms under the bank credit constraint from the viewpoint of trade credit. Firstly, by introducing trade credit into heterogeneous firms' export model, this paper proves that trade credit promotes export either directly or indirectly under bank credit constraint. One promotion mechanism is to ease financing constraint on the export variable cost. Another promotion mechanism is to promote the bank credit and then re- duce export cost. Then, using the panel data of Chinese manufacturing firms and applying Heckman selection model, this paper makes an empirical analysis from angles of export probability and export strength. The empirical results verify the above theoretical analysis and find that the positive effects of trade credit on ex- port are more obvious in highly competitive industries than in low competitive in- dustries and in private firms than in other firms, but the effects are not signifi- cant in the state-owned firms and collectively-owned firms.