工业工程
工業工程
공업공정
Industrial Engineering Journal
2015年
2期
15~19
,共null页
生产能力储备 政府和企业 应急物资 演化博弈
生產能力儲備 政府和企業 應急物資 縯化博弈
생산능력저비 정부화기업 응급물자 연화박혁
capacity reserve; government and enterprise; emergency materials; evolutionary game
研究政府和企业共同储备应急物资生产能力的合作问题,就3种不同条件（无任何措施、惩罚、惩罚和补贴并行）政府和协议企业之间在应急物资生产能力的共同储备进行演化博弈分析。分析表明：在一定条件下,企业储备的收益和成本,政府定期或不定期检查的成本、政府奖惩力度等是影响双方合作的关键因素。通过算例对所得结论进行验证,最后给出应急物资生产能力储备的策略建议。
研究政府和企業共同儲備應急物資生產能力的閤作問題,就3種不同條件（無任何措施、懲罰、懲罰和補貼併行）政府和協議企業之間在應急物資生產能力的共同儲備進行縯化博弈分析。分析錶明：在一定條件下,企業儲備的收益和成本,政府定期或不定期檢查的成本、政府獎懲力度等是影響雙方閤作的關鍵因素。通過算例對所得結論進行驗證,最後給齣應急物資生產能力儲備的策略建議。
연구정부화기업공동저비응급물자생산능력적합작문제,취3충불동조건（무임하조시、징벌、징벌화보첩병행）정부화협의기업지간재응급물자생산능력적공동저비진행연화박혁분석。분석표명：재일정조건하,기업저비적수익화성본,정부정기혹불정기검사적성본、정부장징력도등시영향쌍방합작적관건인소。통과산례대소득결론진행험증,최후급출응급물자생산능력저비적책략건의。
With the target of maximizing time efficiency and minimizing disaster loss, emergency supplies focus on the cooperation of emergency capacity reserve between government and enterprise. Under three different conditions （without any measures, punishment, punishment and subsidies in parallel） , an evolu- tionary game analysis is conducted in terms of emergency productivity reserve between the government and the enterprises. Analysis shows that under certain conditions, the government＇s inspection cost, regular or irregular, government＇s subsidies and punishment, are the key factors that influence the cooperation of both sides. And through a numerical example to validate the conclusion, the emergency productivity re- serve strategy is analyzed.
