CAJ | 학술논문

本文设计了一个鸡尾酒配比实验,采用实验研究的方法检验了短视契约、终止契约和长期契约对实验者创新的影响,研究结果表明：（1）与短视契约和终止契约相比,长期契约下实验者的创新绩效更好;（2）与短视契约和终止契约相比,长期契约下实验者的创新水平更高;而且上述结果在考虑实验者风险偏好的情况下依然是稳健的。该实验说明容忍经理人短期的失败,并赋予长期薪酬更高的权重能够激励经理人进行更多的创新投入,并且有效的提高创新绩效。
본문설계료일개계미주배비실험,채용실험연구적방법검험료단시계약、종지계약화장기계약대실험자창신적영향,연구결과표명：（1）여단시계약화종지계약상비,장기계약하실험자적창신적효경호;（2）여단시계약화종지계약상비,장기계약하실험자적창신수평경고;이차상술결과재고필실험자풍험편호적정황하의연시은건적。해실험설명용인경리인단기적실패,병부여장기신수경고적권중능구격려경리인진행경다적창신투입,병차유효적제고창신적효。
Sustaining innovation is very important for an enterprise＇s development. However, innovation is a special activity with high degree of uncertainty, requiring long-term investment, and having negative impact on the enterprise＇s short-term performance. For these reasons, the career-concerned managers are reluctant to invest in innovation activities. This phenomenon is known as managerial myopia. Obviously, the managerial myopia behavior would reduce the managers＇ willingness for innovation. Thus, it is an urgent and core issue to design a reasonable pay system that encourages managers for more innovation. In this paper, we used the experiment method to test the relationship between manager innovation and three different compensation contracts, including short-term contract, long-term contract and termination contract. In each contract, we designed a cocktail experiment with 20 periods. Results show that comparing with short-term contracts and termination contracts, of long-term contracts has a significantly better performance. It is easier for experiment subjects under the long-term contracts to find the optimal operating region in the final period. The bar＇s benefit in the last period and the maximum benefit of each period are significantly higher than that of the other two contracts. （2） After analyzing the innovation process under different contracts, we found that comparing with short-term contracts and termination contracts, subjects under the long-term contracts invest more in innovation. Specifically, in the fast 10 periods they are more likely to run the bar under the non-given location （T spot）. The average standard deviation of three successive terms and the bars＇ profit in each period are significantly higher than those of the other two contracts. （3） Finally, by comparing the average profit of bars under different contracts, we find that the bars＇ profit under long-term contract is significantly higher than that of the other two contracts. （4） The above results are still robust after considering the experimenters＇ risk preferences. This paper shows that combing the tolerance for early failure with the reward for long-term success is effective in motivating innovation. Thus, long-term stock options or putting higher weight in long-term payment would effectively motivate managers＇ innovation.