外国经济与管理
外國經濟與管理
외국경제여관리
Foreign Economies & Management
2015年
5期
75~84
,共null页
期权激励 行权日倒签 授予日倒签 信息择时披露
期權激勵 行權日倒籤 授予日倒籤 信息擇時披露
기권격려 행권일도첨 수여일도첨 신식택시피로
stock option incentive;exercise backdating;grant backdating;timing infor-mation disclosure
由于存在高管自利择时行为，期权激励有可能无法实现缓解公司高管与股东利益冲突的激励相容目标。本文从高管在期权激励契约的授予、行权及行权所得股票的出售三个环节中的事前信息披露时间操纵和事后倒签这两类择时行为出发，对国外相关研究文献进行了梳理和评述。在此基础上，根据我国的高管期权激励制度和相应的税收制度安排，阐述了实施期权激励的高管为了最大化自身期权激励净收益，在激励计划披露、行权以及行权所得股票的出售等关键环节也存在的自利择时行为动机；并结合我国公司治理环境，剖析了股东治理、董事会治理对期权激励中的高管择时行为的影响。本文对于丰富和深化我国期权激励中高管行为的研究具有启发意义。
由于存在高管自利擇時行為，期權激勵有可能無法實現緩解公司高管與股東利益遲突的激勵相容目標。本文從高管在期權激勵契約的授予、行權及行權所得股票的齣售三箇環節中的事前信息披露時間操縱和事後倒籤這兩類擇時行為齣髮，對國外相關研究文獻進行瞭梳理和評述。在此基礎上，根據我國的高管期權激勵製度和相應的稅收製度安排，闡述瞭實施期權激勵的高管為瞭最大化自身期權激勵淨收益，在激勵計劃披露、行權以及行權所得股票的齣售等關鍵環節也存在的自利擇時行為動機；併結閤我國公司治理環境，剖析瞭股東治理、董事會治理對期權激勵中的高管擇時行為的影響。本文對于豐富和深化我國期權激勵中高管行為的研究具有啟髮意義。
유우존재고관자리택시행위，기권격려유가능무법실현완해공사고관여고동이익충돌적격려상용목표。본문종고관재기권격려계약적수여、행권급행권소득고표적출수삼개배절중적사전신식피로시간조종화사후도첨저량류택시행위출발，대국외상관연구문헌진행료소리화평술。재차기출상，근거아국적고관기권격려제도화상응적세수제도안배，천술료실시기권격려적고관위료최대화자신기권격려정수익，재격려계화피로、행권이급행권소득고표적출수등관건배절야존재적자리택시행위동궤；병결합아국공사치리배경，부석료고동치리、동사회치리대기권격려중적고관택시행위적영향。본문대우봉부화심화아국기권격려중고관행위적연구구유계발의의。
Owing to executive self-interest timing behavior, stock option incentives may be a failure to reach the incentive compatibility goal of alleviating me interest conflict between executives and shareholders.This paper systematically reviews western literature related to timing manipulation of ex ante information disclosure and ex post backdating at three links of executive stock option awards, exercise and stock selling after exercise. And according to executive stock option incentive system and corresponding tax system arrangement in China,it states that executives with stock option exercises have the motivation for self- interest timing behavior at key links of incentive plan disclosure, exercise and stock selling af- ter exercise in order to maximize net profits of their own stock options.And based on corpo- rate governance in China, it explores the effects of stockholder governance and board govern- ance on executive timing behavior in stock option incentives.It provides enlightenment for en- riching and deepening the research of executive behavior in stock option incentives in China.
