改革与战略
改革與戰略
개혁여전략
Reformation & Strategy
2015年
4期
55~61
,共null页
碳排放标准 微分博弈 碳减排成本 福利最大化
碳排放標準 微分博弈 碳減排成本 福利最大化
탄배방표준 미분박혁 탄감배성본 복리최대화
carbon emissions standards; differential game; carbon reduction cost; welfare maximization
文章基于微分博弈原理,分析在碳排放标准政策下,南北国家基于福利最大化的占优策略均衡。研究发现,在气候政策对称时,执行相同严格程度的碳排放标准政策对南方国家来说是相对不公平的。运用HJB方程求得静态线性马尔科夫完美纳什均衡,结果显示,基于福利最大化,均衡情况下的策略选择应该是北方国家比南方国家实施更为严格的碳排放标准政策。并且,对于给定的碳排放水平S,降低南方国家的碳减排成本有利于全球福利的增加。
文章基于微分博弈原理,分析在碳排放標準政策下,南北國傢基于福利最大化的佔優策略均衡。研究髮現,在氣候政策對稱時,執行相同嚴格程度的碳排放標準政策對南方國傢來說是相對不公平的。運用HJB方程求得靜態線性馬爾科伕完美納什均衡,結果顯示,基于福利最大化,均衡情況下的策略選擇應該是北方國傢比南方國傢實施更為嚴格的碳排放標準政策。併且,對于給定的碳排放水平S,降低南方國傢的碳減排成本有利于全毬福利的增加。
문장기우미분박혁원리,분석재탄배방표준정책하,남북국가기우복리최대화적점우책략균형。연구발현,재기후정책대칭시,집행상동엄격정도적탄배방표준정책대남방국가래설시상대불공평적。운용HJB방정구득정태선성마이과부완미납십균형,결과현시,기우복리최대화,균형정황하적책략선택응해시북방국가비남방국가실시경위엄격적탄배방표준정책。병차,대우급정적탄배방수평S,강저남방국가적탄감배성본유리우전구복리적증가。
Based on differential game theory and under the condition of carbon emissions standard policy, this paper analyzes the dominant strategy equilibrium of the two countries （South and North） under the welfare maximization. This study shows that when the climate policy is symmetrical, adapting the same level of carbon emission standard is relatively not fair for the South. By using the HJB equation, there is a static linear Markov perfect Nash equilibrium, which shows that based on welfare maximization hypothesis; the equilibrium strategy choice is that the north should implement a stricter emissions standard than the south. And for a given level of carbon emission, S, reducing the carbon reduction cost of the south is conducive to the increase of the global welfare.
