CAJ | 학술논문

面对来自实验主义者的直觉挑战,提摩西·威廉姆森通过日常认知能力捍卫了思想实验激发的命题作为哲学理论证据的主张。根据威廉姆森的观点,实验主义的直觉挑战是一种应该被拒斥的判断怀疑主义。传统主义诉诸直觉的辩护策略是引发怀疑主义的理论根源。乔纳森·温伯格反对威廉姆森把实验主义归为怀疑主义的主张;杰西卡·布朗为传统主义提供了辩护。但是从哲学方法论的角度来看,威廉姆森的辩护策略是不充分的并且不能完全回应实验主义的挑战。
면대래자실험주의자적직각도전,제마서·위렴모삼통과일상인지능력한위료사상실험격발적명제작위철학이론증거적주장。근거위렴모삼적관점,실험주의적직각도전시일충응해피거척적판단부의주의。전통주의소제직각적변호책략시인발부의주의적이론근원。교납삼·온백격반대위렴모삼파실험주의귀위부의주의적주장;걸서잡·포랑위전통주의제공료변호。단시종철학방법론적각도래간,위렴모삼적변호책략시불충분적병차불능완전회응실험주의적도전。
Facing the intuition challenge from experimentalists , by means of ordinary cognitive capacity , Timothy Williamson defends that a proposition prompted by thought experiment is evidence for philosophy theory .In accordance with Williamson’s view ,the intuition challenge from experimentalists is a kind of judgment skepticism which should be refuted by philosophers .This kind of judgment skepticism is brought about by the justification strategy of traditionalism w hich appeals to intuitions to justify the proposition prompted by thought experiment as evidence for philosophy theory . Jonathan M . Weinberg argues against Williamson’ s view w hich attributes experimentalists to skepticism ;Jessica Brow n defends the justification strategy of traditionalism . However ,appeal to ordinary cognitive capacity is not sufficient to justify the proposition prompted by thought experiment as evidence .Additionally ,Williamson does not completely reply the intuition challenge from experimentalists .