CAJ | 학술논문

股权激励被视为解决研发支出中代理冲突的重要工具,但现有经验证据并不稳定甚至相互矛盾。基于股权激励异质性的视角,本文引入新的股权激励特征——股权激励价值的股价及股价波动率敏感性,考察股权激励对企业研发支出的驱动机制,并利用2006-2012年我国实施股权激励的上市公司作为样本进行检验。研究发现：股权激励对企业研发支出的驱动机制包含风险规避效应与激励效应两个相反维度,最终驱动方向与强度取决于两类效应的博弈;限制性股票的风险规避效应显著强于股票期权;股票期权的激励效应显著强于限制性股票;市场竞争程度、企业产权性质与授予动机对限制性股票与股票期权的两类效应产生调节作用。
고권격려피시위해결연발지출중대리충돌적중요공구,단현유경험증거병불은정심지상호모순。기우고권격려이질성적시각,본문인입신적고권격려특정——고권격려개치적고개급고개파동솔민감성,고찰고권격려대기업연발지출적구동궤제,병이용2006-2012년아국실시고권격려적상시공사작위양본진행검험。연구발현：고권격려대기업연발지출적구동궤제포함풍험규피효응여격려효응량개상반유도,최종구동방향여강도취결우량류효응적박혁;한제성고표적풍험규피효응현저강우고표기권;고표기권적격려효응현저강우한제성고표;시장경쟁정도、기업산권성질여수여동궤대한제성고표여고표기권적량류효응산생조절작용。
Equity incentive is treated as an essential tool to offset the conflict in the R＆D expenditure decision, but the existing evidence is contradictory. Based on the perspective of incentive heterogeneity, this paper introduces two new characteris- tics of equity incentive which are the equity value share price sensitivity and equity value price volatility sensitivity. We firstly study the driving mechanism of equity incentive on R＆D expenditure and the different mechanism among restricted stocks and options, and then do an empirical test with the data from 2006 to 2012. This paper finds equity incentive includes opposite impacts on R＆D expenditure which are the risk aversion effect and the incentive effect. The ultimate driving force depends on the relative magnitudes of the two effects. Moreover, the restricted stock holds significantly stronger risk aversion effect and significantly weaker incentive effect than the option. This paper also finds that the extent of market competition, the property rights and the grant motive moderate the two effects.