CAJ | 학술논문

由于契约的不完全性和不可执行性,中小企业信贷约束严重。新制度经济学信贷排斥模型解释了中小企业信贷约束的成因,即资产额低于金融机构所能获取正常利润的界限。资产规模小是中小企业的内在特征,也是约束条件,它使金融机构贷款成本提高,使中小企业偏向选择较高的风险水平。从制度结构视域考察信贷约束问题,可以摆脱资产规模不利的限制。研究发现,应发挥非政府组织与中小企业联系较多的比较优势,利用政府权威性优势以及市场的调节供求优势来改善契约的不完全性。这种结构层面的制度互补是改善中小企业信贷约束的可行选择。
유우계약적불완전성화불가집행성,중소기업신대약속엄중。신제도경제학신대배척모형해석료중소기업신대약속적성인,즉자산액저우금융궤구소능획취정상리윤적계한。자산규모소시중소기업적내재특정,야시약속조건,타사금융궤구대관성본제고,사중소기업편향선택교고적풍험수평。종제도결구시역고찰신대약속문제,가이파탈자산규모불리적한제。연구발현,응발휘비정부조직여중소기업련계교다적비교우세,이용정부권위성우세이급시장적조절공구우세래개선계약적불완전성。저충결구층면적제도호보시개선중소기업신대약속적가행선택。
There are many credit constraints for small and medium- sized enterprises due to incomplete and unenforceable contracts. The model of credit market exclusion in new institutional economics explains that the amount of wealth is beyond the limit that financial institution can get normal profit. Lower capital is the inner characteristic of SME. View of the structure of in- stitution constrained credit can be away from the disadvantage of capital scale. With the help of links between non - gov- ernmental organizations and SME, it is a feasible choice to use the institutional eomplementation among government, market and non - governmental organizations to improve the incomplete contract for reducing the credit constraints of SME.