中国科技论坛
中國科技論罈
중국과기론단
Forum on Science and Technology in China
2015年
6期
16~21
,共null页
技术创新 激励机制 静态博弈 动态博弈
技術創新 激勵機製 靜態博弈 動態博弈
기술창신 격려궤제 정태박혁 동태박혁
Technological innovation ; Incentives ; Static game ; Dynamic game
根据企业技术创新过程,将政府的激励政策分为6种,采用静态与动态博弈相结合的方法.探讨政府激励政策对企业技术创新的作用机制。研究表明:政府的直接补贴和税费返还可提高企业的技术创新水平,但会造成社会成本的浪费,损害社会福利;政府购买与产学研合作可促进社会福利的最大化,但产学研合作中企业的利润增量明显小于政府购买下的利润增量;政府的知识产权保护+固定权利金授权、政府的知识产权保护+单位权利金授权不但可以实现企业技术创新水平的最优,而且可以实现社会资源的帕累托最优;政府的知识产权保护+单位权利金授权可使大企业所得的均衡利润大于采用固定权利金授权方式所得的均衡利润,而政府的知识产权保护+固定权利金授权可使小企业的均衡收益大于采用单位权利金授权方式所得的利润。
根據企業技術創新過程,將政府的激勵政策分為6種,採用靜態與動態博弈相結閤的方法.探討政府激勵政策對企業技術創新的作用機製。研究錶明:政府的直接補貼和稅費返還可提高企業的技術創新水平,但會造成社會成本的浪費,損害社會福利;政府購買與產學研閤作可促進社會福利的最大化,但產學研閤作中企業的利潤增量明顯小于政府購買下的利潤增量;政府的知識產權保護+固定權利金授權、政府的知識產權保護+單位權利金授權不但可以實現企業技術創新水平的最優,而且可以實現社會資源的帕纍託最優;政府的知識產權保護+單位權利金授權可使大企業所得的均衡利潤大于採用固定權利金授權方式所得的均衡利潤,而政府的知識產權保護+固定權利金授權可使小企業的均衡收益大于採用單位權利金授權方式所得的利潤。
근거기업기술창신과정,장정부적격려정책분위6충,채용정태여동태박혁상결합적방법.탐토정부격려정책대기업기술창신적작용궤제。연구표명:정부적직접보첩화세비반환가제고기업적기술창신수평,단회조성사회성본적낭비,손해사회복리;정부구매여산학연합작가촉진사회복리적최대화,단산학연합작중기업적리윤증량명현소우정부구매하적리윤증량;정부적지식산권보호+고정권리금수권、정부적지식산권보호+단위권리금수권불단가이실현기업기술창신수평적최우,이차가이실현사회자원적파루탁최우;정부적지식산권보호+단위권리금수권가사대기업소득적균형리윤대우채용고정권리금수권방식소득적균형리윤,이정부적지식산권보호+고정권리금수권가사소기업적균형수익대우채용단위권리금수권방식소득적리윤。
Based on the classic "Clever Pig Game" model, it divided government incentives on enterprise technology innovation into six kinds according to process of technological innovation. Adopting the method of combining static and dynamic game, the mechanism of government incentives for technological innovation is explored. The study shows that the direct government subsidies and tax return can increase the level of technological innovation of enterprises, but it will result in the waste of social costs and harming social welfare. Secondly, the government purchasing and industry-university-research institute cooperation can promote social welfare, but the incremental profit of the enterprise in the latter is significantly less than the incremental profits under government purchases. Again, preferential financing policies, "the government's protection of intellectual property rights gold + Fixed authorization", "the government's protection of intellectual property rights gold + units authorized" can not only achieve the optimal level of technological innovation, but also can achieve Pareto optimal. Finally, the equilibrium profit of large enterprises under "the government's protection of intellectual property rights gold + units authorized" is greater than that of the premium fixed income equalization license prof- its. While the equilibrium profit of small enterprises under "the government's protection of intellectual property rights gold + Fixed au-thorization" is greater than that of unit royalty license profits.