CAJ | 학술논문

不合作博弈常见于政策实践,根源在于一定时空内个体的理性与集体的理性不一致。农村计生政策实施中,政策执行者与目标群体表现为囚徒困境和保证型博弈（亦称捕鹿游戏）。前者是一种在个体利益最大化法则下的帕累托无效均衡,后者是在环境不确定和人类信任不够时,另一种次优均衡。两种博弈均衡都能使政策失效,而打破政策困境,需要具体分析：囚徒困境须采取可置信的承诺、完善绩效考核制度、强化政策的公正平等;保证型博弈困境须加强政策执行者与目标群体之间的信任基础,完善信息反馈机制。
불합작박혁상견우정책실천,근원재우일정시공내개체적이성여집체적이성불일치。농촌계생정책실시중,정책집행자여목표군체표현위수도곤경화보증형박혁（역칭포록유희）。전자시일충재개체이익최대화법칙하적파루탁무효균형,후자시재배경불학정화인류신임불구시,령일충차우균형。량충박혁균형도능사정책실효,이타파정책곤경,수요구체분석：수도곤경수채취가치신적승낙、완선적효고핵제도、강화정책적공정평등;보증형박혁곤경수가강정책집행자여목표군체지간적신임기출,완선신식반궤궤제。
The non-cooperation game is common in policy practice; the reason can be found in individual and collective rationality inconsistence in a certain time and space. In implementing rural family planning policy, the policy executors and the target groups exhibit the prisoner＇s predicament and assurance game （also known as the deer game）. The former is the game of Pareto＇s equilibrium in selection for lack of individual benefit maximization rule, while the latter is sub-optima equilibrium in the uncertain environment and non-trust in human being. Two kinds of game equilibrium can make policy failure. Breaking the policy dilemma entails specific analysis. The pris- oner＇s predicament should depend on credible commitment, perfect performance appraisal system, and strengthen the policy equality and justice. The assurance game predicament should strengthen the foundation of trust in the policy executors and the target groups, and perfect information feedback mechanism.