生态经济
生態經濟
생태경제
Ecological Economy
2015年
6期
147~149
,共null页
流域 水资源 利益相关者 演化博弈
流域 水資源 利益相關者 縯化博弈
류역 수자원 이익상관자 연화박혁
river basin; water resource; stakeholder; evolutionary game
采用演化博弈方法分析流域水生态系统动态演化过程.通过理论假设和模型分析发现:在水质一定条件下,参与人的策略选择由不同行为的支付水平决定;当参与人策略为外生变量时,水质与参与人混合策略之间存在稳定的演化均衡.对流域水资源系统进行动态分析,发现在水资源具备再生条件下,政府可以根据不同的水质状况选择不同的税收和补贴政策,改变参与者的策略选择,系统才能演化到最优的均衡水平.
採用縯化博弈方法分析流域水生態繫統動態縯化過程.通過理論假設和模型分析髮現:在水質一定條件下,參與人的策略選擇由不同行為的支付水平決定;噹參與人策略為外生變量時,水質與參與人混閤策略之間存在穩定的縯化均衡.對流域水資源繫統進行動態分析,髮現在水資源具備再生條件下,政府可以根據不同的水質狀況選擇不同的稅收和補貼政策,改變參與者的策略選擇,繫統纔能縯化到最優的均衡水平.
채용연화박혁방법분석류역수생태계통동태연화과정.통과이론가설화모형분석발현:재수질일정조건하,삼여인적책략선택유불동행위적지부수평결정;당삼여인책략위외생변량시,수질여삼여인혼합책략지간존재은정적연화균형.대류역수자원계통진행동태분석,발현재수자원구비재생조건하,정부가이근거불동적수질상황선택불동적세수화보첩정책,개변삼여자적책략선택,계통재능연화도최우적균형수평.
In this paper we analyze the dynamic evolution of water system in river basin by using the evolutionary game theory. Through analyzing the theoretical hypothesis and model analysis, we find that the strategic choice of players is decided by payoffs of actions when water quality under certain conditions, there exist stable evolutionary equilibrium between water quality and players mixed strategy when payoffs of player' actions are exogenous. By analyzing combined system dynamics in water resource, we find that government can choose appropriate taxes and subsidies according to different water quality state if resource of river basin ecology has the ability to regenerate, so that stakeholders have to change their strategic choices, which make the combined system evolve to the optimal equilibrium.