CAJ | 학술논문

在高管薪酬水平过高、企业内部薪酬差距过大的背景下,从纵向公平偏好的视角研究了企业内部的委托代理关系和薪酬激励机制,假设员工是具有嫉妒和自豪两种纵向公平偏好的风险规避者,设计了代理人具有纵向公平偏好的委托代理模型。通过模型求解得到如下结论：当总经理的预期净收入高于员工时,其期望效用随着员工纵向公平偏好强度的提高而减小;当总经理的预期净收入低于员工时,其期望效用随着员工纵向公平偏好强度的提高而增大。
재고관신수수평과고、기업내부신수차거과대적배경하,종종향공평편호적시각연구료기업내부적위탁대리관계화신수격려궤제,가설원공시구유질투화자호량충종향공평편호적풍험규피자,설계료대리인구유종향공평편호적위탁대리모형。통과모형구해득도여하결론：당총경리적예기정수입고우원공시,기기망효용수착원공종향공평편호강도적제고이감소;당총경리적예기정수입저우원공시,기기망효용수착원공종향공평편호강도적제고이증대。
Under the background of the excessively high pay of senior executives and the internal huge pay gap in enterprises, this paper stuoles the principal-agent relationship and salary incentive mechanism in enterprises from the perspective of vertical fairness preference. It assumes that normal employees of enterprises are the rlsk-averter with vertical fairness preference of jealousy and pride, and designs a prlncipal-agent model in which the agent has vertical fairness preference. It gets the following conclusions through solving the model：when the general manager＇s expected net income is higher（lower） than that of the employee,the expected utility of the general manager decreases（increases） with the increase of the employee＇s vertical fairness preference degree.