CAJ | 학술논문

机构投资者持股对公司治理的积极作用已经得到广泛认可,然而传统观点认为增加机构持股比例会抑制公司投资、降低高管薪酬,这与近期实证研究发现的证据存在矛盾。为此构建了基于经理人职业声誉顾虑的理论模型,试图为相关实证结果提供合理的解释。研究表明,机构持股比例越高,越能增强机构投资者监督、了解经理人经营能力的意愿,从而确保高能力经理人不会因偶然投资失败而面临声誉风险,这就增大了高能力经理人为公司投资创利的可能性,同时也使经理人能够获得与自身经营能力相适应的薪酬回报。
궤구투자자지고대공사치리적적겁작용이경득도엄범인가,연이전통관점인위증가궤구지고비례회억제공사투자、강저고관신수,저여근기실증연구발현적증거존재모순。위차구건료기우경리인직업성예고필적이론모형,시도위상관실증결과제공합리적해석。연구표명,궤구지고비례월고,월능증강궤구투자자감독、료해경리인경영능력적의원,종이학보고능력경리인불회인우연투자실패이면림성예풍험,저취증대료고능력경리인위공사투자창리적가능성,동시야사경리인능구획득여자신경영능력상괄응적신수회보。
Institutional investors holding an active role in corporate governance has been widely recognized,but the tradi-tional view that increases in the proportion of institutional ownership will inhibit investment and reduce executive compen-sation,which contradicts the evidence of recent empirical researches.In this paper,a theoretical model was constructed based on the manager′s career concerns,trying to provide a reasonable explanation for the relevant empirical results.Stud-ies have shown that the higher the proportion of institutional ownership,the more investors′willing to supervise the manag-ers,ensuring high capability managers will not fail due to accidental reputational risk.Therefore,managers will have a greater possibility to make profitable investment,while be able to get rewards according to their capability.