CAJ | 학술논문

中国地方政府存在过度负债的行为倾向,这与预算约束呈现了背离之势。研究地方政府突破预算约束而过度负债的行为机制,可以从客观和主观两方面入手：客观上,由于分税制、项目制、晋升激励机制等体制的不完善,导致地方政府负债过度;主观上,地方政府和金融机构＂经济人＂的本质诱发道德风险而使地方政府过度负债。抑制地方政府过度负债的行为,关键在于建立规范的地方融资举债机制,避免金融道德风险。
중국지방정부존재과도부채적행위경향,저여예산약속정현료배리지세。연구지방정부돌파예산약속이과도부채적행위궤제,가이종객관화주관량방면입수：객관상,유우분세제、항목제、진승격려궤제등체제적불완선,도치지방정부부채과도;주관상,지방정부화금융궤구＂경제인＂적본질유발도덕풍험이사지방정부과도부채。억제지방정부과도부채적행위,관건재우건립규범적지방융자거채궤제,피면금융도덕풍험。
It is a general tendency that local governments＇ debts in China are excessive ,which is a violation to the budget constraint. To research the mechanism of the excessive debts, the authors starts from two aspects ob- jective and subjective. Objectively, as the systems of tax allocation, project system and promotion incentives are im- perfect, local governments need to live on loans. And subjectively, because local governments and financial institu- tions have the nature of ＂economic person＂ inducing moral hazards,which lead governments into debts. The key to restrain the excessive debts of local governments is to establish a standardized debt financing mechanism and to a- void financial moral hazards.