财经研究
財經研究
재경연구
The Study of Finance and Economics
2015年
4期
100~109
,共null页
正交易成本 法律 边缘改革 制度演化
正交易成本 法律 邊緣改革 製度縯化
정교역성본 법률 변연개혁 제도연화
positive transaction cost; law; marginal revolution; institutional evolution
科斯早期关于交易成本和＂法律功能论＂的思想对经济学界产生了深刻的影响,而其后期关于＂法律生成论＂的思想却尚未得到学术界应有的重视。文章通过梳理科斯关于法经济学思想的前后变化,以中国农村的家庭联产承包责任制为案例说明科斯后期思想的转向。研究发现：（1）科斯对法律与经济关系的认识经历了早期的＂法律功能论＂到后期的＂法律生成论＂的转变,两者形成互补关系;（2）制度变迁成本的降低是＂边缘改革＂启动的关键前提,而基层经济力量的积累又推动了＂亲市场＂法律体系的生成;（3）科斯的＂法律生成论＂的逻辑并不完善,中国的改革实践表明,既得利益的松动和思想观念的改变以及上层政治权力的支持是制度变迁成本降低的必要条件。因此,在理想情境下,转型期的法律应该主动与来自基层的制度演化相调试,从而形成更为＂亲市场＂法律体系。
科斯早期關于交易成本和＂法律功能論＂的思想對經濟學界產生瞭深刻的影響,而其後期關于＂法律生成論＂的思想卻尚未得到學術界應有的重視。文章通過梳理科斯關于法經濟學思想的前後變化,以中國農村的傢庭聯產承包責任製為案例說明科斯後期思想的轉嚮。研究髮現：（1）科斯對法律與經濟關繫的認識經歷瞭早期的＂法律功能論＂到後期的＂法律生成論＂的轉變,兩者形成互補關繫;（2）製度變遷成本的降低是＂邊緣改革＂啟動的關鍵前提,而基層經濟力量的積纍又推動瞭＂親市場＂法律體繫的生成;（3）科斯的＂法律生成論＂的邏輯併不完善,中國的改革實踐錶明,既得利益的鬆動和思想觀唸的改變以及上層政治權力的支持是製度變遷成本降低的必要條件。因此,在理想情境下,轉型期的法律應該主動與來自基層的製度縯化相調試,從而形成更為＂親市場＂法律體繫。
과사조기관우교역성본화＂법률공능론＂적사상대경제학계산생료심각적영향,이기후기관우＂법률생성론＂적사상각상미득도학술계응유적중시。문장통과소이과사관우법경제학사상적전후변화,이중국농촌적가정련산승포책임제위안례설명과사후기사상적전향。연구발현：（1）과사대법률여경제관계적인식경력료조기적＂법률공능론＂도후기적＂법률생성론＂적전변,량자형성호보관계;（2）제도변천성본적강저시＂변연개혁＂계동적관건전제,이기층경제역량적적루우추동료＂친시장＂법률체계적생성;（3）과사적＂법률생성론＂적라집병불완선,중국적개혁실천표명,기득이익적송동화사상관념적개변이급상층정치권력적지지시제도변천성본강저적필요조건。인차,재이상정경하,전형기적법률응해주동여래자기층적제도연화상조시,종이형성경위＂친시장＂법률체계。
The early thought of Coase about transaction costs and law＇s function has the profound effect on the economics field,but his later thought about law＇s evolution has not yet attracted enough attention from scholars.Through a review of the differences between early and later thought of Coase in the field of law and economics,this paper explains Coase＇s later thought about law＇s evolution in a case of household contract responsibility system of rural China.It arrives at the following conclusions：firstly,Coase＇s idea about the relationship between law and economy has changed from early thought about law＇s function to later thought about law＇s evolution,which are complementary;secondly,the decline in institutional evolution costs is the key premise of beginning marginal revolution,and the accumulation of economic power of grassroots also promotes the generation of pro-market law system;thirdly,there are disadvantages in Coase＇s logics of law＇s evolution,and the reform experiences in China show that loosening constraints on vested interest and ideology,and the supports from supreme political power are necessary conditions for the decline in institutional evolution costs.Therefore,in an ideal context,law in the transition period should be active to coordinate with institutional evolution from grassroots,thereby leading to more pro-market law system.
