南开管理评论
南開管理評論
남개관리평론
Nankai Business Review
2015年
3期
122~131
,共null页
管理者 过度自信 成本粘性 债务约束
管理者 過度自信 成本粘性 債務約束
관리자 과도자신 성본점성 채무약속
Managers; Overconfidence; Cost Stickiness; Debt Constraints
本文关注了管理者过度自信对公司成本粘性的影响。过度自信的管理者会高估未来的现金流,低估未来的风险,而导致公司较高的成本粘性。以2001-2011年沪深两市A股非国有制造类上市公司为研究样本,本文展开实证检验,发现：（1）管理者过度自信的公司,其成本粘性显著更高;（2）这一关系仅存在于债务约束较弱的情况下,债务约束较强时,管理者过度自信并不会显著提高公司成本粘性;（3）区分债务来源、银行贷款债务与其他债务对管理者过度自信与成本粘性的关系都能起到较好的约束作用;区分债务期限、长期债务与短期债务均有较好的约束作用,且短期债务的约束效果更佳。文章从宏观景气指数、管理者相对薪酬、管理者持股变化等不同方面衡量管理者过度自信,得到的证据一致。本文的发现揭示了管理者过度自信对公司成本性态的影响,也显示了债务约束的积极治理效应。
本文關註瞭管理者過度自信對公司成本粘性的影響。過度自信的管理者會高估未來的現金流,低估未來的風險,而導緻公司較高的成本粘性。以2001-2011年滬深兩市A股非國有製造類上市公司為研究樣本,本文展開實證檢驗,髮現：（1）管理者過度自信的公司,其成本粘性顯著更高;（2）這一關繫僅存在于債務約束較弱的情況下,債務約束較彊時,管理者過度自信併不會顯著提高公司成本粘性;（3）區分債務來源、銀行貸款債務與其他債務對管理者過度自信與成本粘性的關繫都能起到較好的約束作用;區分債務期限、長期債務與短期債務均有較好的約束作用,且短期債務的約束效果更佳。文章從宏觀景氣指數、管理者相對薪酬、管理者持股變化等不同方麵衡量管理者過度自信,得到的證據一緻。本文的髮現揭示瞭管理者過度自信對公司成本性態的影響,也顯示瞭債務約束的積極治理效應。
본문관주료관리자과도자신대공사성본점성적영향。과도자신적관리자회고고미래적현금류,저고미래적풍험,이도치공사교고적성본점성。이2001-2011년호심량시A고비국유제조류상시공사위연구양본,본문전개실증검험,발현：（1）관리자과도자신적공사,기성본점성현저경고;（2）저일관계부존재우채무약속교약적정황하,채무약속교강시,관리자과도자신병불회현저제고공사성본점성;（3）구분채무래원、은행대관채무여기타채무대관리자과도자신여성본점성적관계도능기도교호적약속작용;구분채무기한、장기채무여단기채무균유교호적약속작용,차단기채무적약속효과경가。문장종굉관경기지수、관리자상대신수、관리자지고변화등불동방면형량관리자과도자신,득도적증거일치。본문적발현게시료관리자과도자신대공사성본성태적영향,야현시료채무약속적적겁치리효응。
Overconfidence is an important and interesting issue in psychology, economics and management fields. This paper focuses on the effects of manager＇s overconfidence on cost stickiness of com- panies in China. Managers who are overconfident may have tendency to overestimate cash flow and underestimate the risk of future. So even the activity of the company falls, they are unwilling to adjust their former strategy and cut recourses, and it will lead the cost stick- iness of the company to be high. Taking Chinese industry non-SOEs listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges from 2001 to 2011 as the research sample, this paper did empirical tests on the inference. The empirical results show that： （1） Cost stickiness was higher in compa- nies with overconfident managers, which is consistent with the pre- diction; （2） If considering the debt constraints, the above relation only existed under situations where the debt constraints were weak. If the company was under strong debt constraints, the above relation disap- peared; （3） If considering the source of debt, both bank loan and other debt had good governance effect to cost stickiness; if considering the term of debt, both long term and short term loan had good gov- ernance effect to cost stickiness, and the governance effect of short term debt to cost stickiness was even better in some sense. These re- suits were stable under several different measurements of managers＇ overconfidence following former references, such as business climate index, relative pay, and change of managers＇ shares and several other robust checks. The above findings not only show the positive effect of manager＇s overconfidence on cost stickiness of the company, but also indicate the good governance effects of debts to cost stickiness. Overall, this paper supports the optimism theory of cost stickiness from angles of both incentive and ability in China, which may be en- lightening to future studies of this field.
