CAJ | 학술논문

中小企业融资难是长期存在的难题，融资性担保机构的设立对缓解这一难题起到了一定的积极作用。文章从银行视角出发，对担保机构在中小企业贷款中发挥的作用进行了理论和实证分析，得到以下结论：一方面，银行认为国有政策性担保机构与企业的合谋概率较高，对其在担保合同中发出的企业类型信号并不信任（如担保费率等），因而在制定利率时主要依靠自身对企业风险的判断；另一方面，银行认为民营商业性担保机构与企业的合谋概率较低，对其发出的担保信号较为信任，在利率定价时会重点关注其提供的信息。
중소기업융자난시장기존재적난제，융자성담보궤구적설립대완해저일난제기도료일정적적겁작용。문장종은행시각출발，대담보궤구재중소기업대관중발휘적작용진행료이론화실증분석，득도이하결론：일방면，은행인위국유정책성담보궤구여기업적합모개솔교고，대기재담보합동중발출적기업류형신호병불신임（여담보비솔등），인이재제정리솔시주요의고자신대기업풍험적판단；령일방면，은행인위민영상업성담보궤구여기업적합모개솔교저，대기발출적담보신호교위신임，재리솔정개시회중점관주기제공적신식。
The difficulty in funds of SMEs is a long-term problem, and the introduction of financing guarantee institutions partly alleviates the financing adversity of SMEs. From the perspective of banks, this paper theoretically and empirically studies the role of guarantee institutions in the SMEs loans. It reaches the following conclusions： on the one hand, banks do not trust the signals of enterprise type contained in guarantee contracts, like guarantee fees, because they believe that there is a higher probability of collusion between state-policy-based guarantee institutions and SMEs; banks rely on their own judgment on enterprise type when determining the lending rates; on the other hand, banks consider that private commercial guarantee institutions are less likely involved in collusion, so they more trust the guarantee signals sent by private commercial guarantee institutions and care about their guarantee information when pricing the lending rates.