CAJ | 학술논문

由于企业碳减排策略在被动和主动阶段不同,且一些企业已启动主动减排阶段的产品再生策略,本文针对主动碳减排阶段,构建政府补贴下企业主动碳减排阶段成本收益模型和行业成本收益模型,以矩阵正定性判定最优策略是否存在,并分别用数学微分法和拉格朗日乘数法得出企业最优策略和帕累托最优策略。同时探讨如何通过政府补贴激励企业进行帕累托改进,最终实现帕累托最优,并以水泥行业为例验证模型有效性,对关键参数进行灵敏度分析。研究结果表明,企业主动碳减排存在最优策略,企业对碳减排策略的投入随着其相应减排效果系数、减排收益系数与政府超额补贴系数的增加而加大;行业实现帕累托最优需要政府补贴机制引导,且超额补贴系数为行业内定值,随行业内各企业减排效果系数与创新收益系数的增加而减少。算例分析结果验证了模型的有效性,证实了创新收益和政府补贴是企业主动碳减排的关键因素,且企业创新投入随相应创新收益而变化的幅度逐渐增大,企业碳排放强度随政府超额补贴系数增大呈直线下降,减排成本随超额补贴系数增大而减少的幅度逐渐增大。研究结果为企业主动碳减排最优策略选择以及政府财政政策制定提供决策依据。企业选择主动碳减排最优策略时,其产品创新投入和工艺技术创新投入应随减排效果系数的增加而加大,随收益影响系数的增大而递增。管理创新投入应随收益影响系数的增大而逐渐加大,且随政府超额补贴系数的变化更灵敏;政府制定相应补贴政策时,其超额补贴系数为行业内定值,应随行业内各企业创新收益影响系数和碳减排效果系数的增加而相应减少,随管理创新成本系数的增大而有所增加。此外,在政府引导企业碳减排帕累托改进过程中,应保障企业碳减排效率在同一水平,即创新力较强的企业,减排量相应较大,从而实现碳减排的帕累托最优。由于企業碳減排策略在被動和主動階段不同,且一些企業已啟動主動減排階段的產品再生策略,本文針對主動碳減排階段,構建政府補貼下企業主動碳減排階段成本收益模型和行業成本收益模型,以矩陣正定性判定最優策略是否存在,併分彆用數學微分法和拉格朗日乘數法得齣企業最優策略和帕纍託最優策略。同時探討如何通過政府補貼激勵企業進行帕纍託改進,最終實現帕纍託最優,併以水泥行業為例驗證模型有效性,對關鍵參數進行靈敏度分析。研究結果錶明,企業主動碳減排存在最優策略,企業對碳減排策略的投入隨著其相應減排效果繫數、減排收益繫數與政府超額補貼繫數的增加而加大;行業實現帕纍託最優需要政府補貼機製引導,且超額補貼繫數為行業內定值,隨行業內各企業減排效果繫數與創新收益繫數的增加而減少。算例分析結果驗證瞭模型的有效性,證實瞭創新收益和政府補貼是企業主動碳減排的關鍵因素,且企業創新投入隨相應創新收益而變化的幅度逐漸增大,企業碳排放彊度隨政府超額補貼繫數增大呈直線下降,減排成本隨超額補貼繫數增大而減少的幅度逐漸增大。研究結果為企業主動碳減排最優策略選擇以及政府財政政策製定提供決策依據。企業選擇主動碳減排最優策略時,其產品創新投入和工藝技術創新投入應隨減排效果繫數的增加而加大,隨收益影響繫數的增大而遞增。管理創新投入應隨收益影響繫數的增大而逐漸加大,且隨政府超額補貼繫數的變化更靈敏;政府製定相應補貼政策時,其超額補貼繫數為行業內定值,應隨行業內各企業創新收益影響繫數和碳減排效果繫數的增加而相應減少,隨管理創新成本繫數的增大而有所增加。此外,在政府引導企業碳減排帕纍託改進過程中,應保障企業碳減排效率在同一水平,即創新力較彊的企業,減排量相應較大,從而實現碳減排的帕纍託最優。
유우기업탄감배책략재피동화주동계단불동,차일사기업이계동주동감배계단적산품재생책략,본문침대주동탄감배계단,구건정부보첩하기업주동탄감배계단성본수익모형화행업성본수익모형,이구진정정성판정최우책략시부존재,병분별용수학미분법화랍격랑일승수법득출기업최우책략화파루탁최우책략。동시탐토여하통과정부보첩격려기업진행파루탁개진,최종실현파루탁최우,병이수니행업위례험증모형유효성,대관건삼수진행령민도분석。연구결과표명,기업주동탄감배존재최우책략,기업대탄감배책략적투입수착기상응감배효과계수、감배수익계수여정부초액보첩계수적증가이가대;행업실현파루탁최우수요정부보첩궤제인도,차초액보첩계수위행업내정치,수행업내각기업감배효과계수여창신수익계수적증가이감소。산례분석결과험증료모형적유효성,증실료창신수익화정부보첩시기업주동탄감배적관건인소,차기업창신투입수상응창신수익이변화적폭도축점증대,기업탄배방강도수정부초액보첩계수증대정직선하강,감배성본수초액보첩계수증대이감소적폭도축점증대。연구결과위기업주동탄감배최우책략선택이급정부재정정책제정제공결책의거。기업선택주동탄감배최우책략시,기산품창신투입화공예기술창신투입응수감배효과계수적증가이가대,수수익영향계수적증대이체증。관리창신투입응수수익영향계수적증대이축점가대,차수정부초액보첩계수적변화경령민;정부제정상응보첩정책시,기초액보첩계수위행업내정치,응수행업내각기업창신수익영향계수화탄감배효과계수적증가이상응감소,수관리창신성본계수적증대이유소증가。차외,재정부인도기업탄감배파루탁개진과정중,응보장기업탄감배효솔재동일수평,즉창신력교강적기업,감배량상응교대,종이실현탄감배적파루탁최우。
Because of the different corporate carbon reduction strategies between passive active stages, some enterprises have adopted product regeneration strategy to reduce carbon emissions. So focusing on active carbon reduction stage the paper first constructed the cost-benefit model of government subsidized enterprises＇ active carbon reduction and industry cost-benefit model, to determine by matrix positive definiteness whether there is an optimal strategy. We obtained enterprise＇ optimal strategy and Pareto optimality in mathematical and Lag-range multiplier method respectively, and discussed how to encourage enterprises to Implement Pareto improvement through government subsidies to ultimately realize Pareto optimality. Taking cement industry as an example, analysis of model validity and key parameters sensitivity were then made. The results show there exists an optimal carbon reduction strategy, enterprises＇ investment in which increases with the increase of corresponding emission reduction effect coefficient, reduction benefit coefficient, and government extra subsidy coefficient. Realization of industrial Pareto optimality needs government subsidy, and extra subsidy coefficient is an industrial default value, which declines with the increase of enterprises emission reduction effect coefficient and innovation revenue coefficient. The case analysis verified not only model validity but also that innovation income and government subsidies are key factors for enterprises initiative carbon reduction. Besides, variation of enterprise innovation inputs enlarges gradually with corresponding innovation income, enterprise carbon reduction plummets with the increase of government extra subsidy coefficient, and carbon reduction cost decreases with the increase of extra subsidy coefficient. The results will provide a basis not only for enterprises selection of optimal initiative carbon reduction strategy but also for governmental fiscal policy making. When selecting optimal Strategy, the enterprises＇ investment in product innovation and technology innovation should increase with the increase of corresponding emission reduction effect coefficient and benefit coefficient, the investment in management innovation should increase with the increase of corresponding benefit coefficient, and the changes of government extra subsidies coefficient will be more sensitive. When making fiscal policy, the government extra subsidy coefficient should be an industrial default value. In addition, during the Pareto improvement, corporate carbon reduction efficiency should be kept at the same level, that is to say, the corporate having a strong enterprise innovation should emission less carbon dioxide to achieve Pareto optimality.