CAJ | 학술논문

本文通过检验会计信息透明度在债务契约缔结与履行中的作用来考察信贷资金的配置效率。研究发现,会计信息透明度越高的民营企业,在缔结债务契约时获得的借款越多,在债务契约履行中的违约概率也越小,表明信贷资金有较高的配置效率。但政治关联企业不存在这一现象,原因是政治关联替代了会计信息透明度在债务契约缔结时的信号作用。债务契约的履行过程中,不同于国家政治关联企业的自我约束,地方政治关联企业由于能够“借新还旧”,因而不重视维护自身信誉,会计信息透明度难以作为信誉机制发挥作用。换言之,地方政治关联降低了信贷资金的配置效率。研究结果对于提高会计信息契约有用性及治理政治关联的负面影响,有重要启示作用。
본문통과검험회계신식투명도재채무계약체결여리행중적작용래고찰신대자금적배치효솔。연구발현,회계신식투명도월고적민영기업,재체결채무계약시획득적차관월다,재채무계약리행중적위약개솔야월소,표명신대자금유교고적배치효솔。단정치관련기업불존재저일현상,원인시정치관련체대료회계신식투명도재채무계약체결시적신호작용。채무계약적리행과정중,불동우국가정치관련기업적자아약속,지방정치관련기업유우능구“차신환구”,인이불중시유호자신신예,회계신식투명도난이작위신예궤제발휘작용。환언지,지방정치관련강저료신대자금적배치효솔。연구결과대우제고회계신식계약유용성급치리정치관련적부면영향,유중요계시작용。
The paper investigates the allocation efficiency of credit capital through testing the role of accounting transparency in signing and fulfilling of debt contracts. We find that the more transparent accounting information private firms have, the more loans they will get when they contract with bank, and the less default probability the loan contracts will have, which indicates that the allocation of banks＇ credit capital is efficient. But such results do not exist in politically connected finns. The reason is that political connections replace the role of accounting transparency in signing loan contracts.During the loan contracts＇ fulfillment, different from self-discipline of politically-connected firms at national level, local-connection firms can borrow new to repay old, so they don＇t pay much attention to maintain their reputation, and accounting transparency is different to work as reputation mechanism, which indicates that local-connections reduce efficiency of allocation of credit capital. The research results have important implications for both improving the contractual usefulness of accounting information and governing the negative influence of political connections.