CAJ | 학술논문

本文考虑一个单制造商和两个互补性供应商所构成的装配系统, 当市场需求随机时, 制造商采取供应商管理库存的方式来转移零部件的库存风险并决定零部件的批发价格, 两供应商需要在市场需求真正到来之前自行决定各自的零部件生产量, 并承担相应的库存风险. 本文假定供应商存在高成本和低成本两个类型, 利用斯坦伯格博弈和纳什均衡研究了当供应商生产成本信息不对称和对称这两种状态下的生产与定价决策, 分析供应商成本信息共享的价值. 研究表明, 高成本供应商在信息对称时的均衡收益大于信息不对称时的均衡收益, 愿意共享信息, 而低成本供应商在信息不对称时的均衡收益更大, 并不会自愿共享成本信息; 供应商成本信息共享对制造商和供应链也是有利的.
본문고필일개단제조상화량개호보성공응상소구성적장배계통, 당시장수구수궤시, 제조상채취공응상관리고존적방식래전이령부건적고존풍험병결정령부건적비발개격, 량공응상수요재시장수구진정도래지전자행결정각자적령부건생산량, 병승담상응적고존풍험. 본문가정공응상존재고성본화저성본량개류형, 이용사탄백격박혁화납십균형연구료당공응상 생산성본신식불대칭화대칭저량충상태하적생산여정개결책, 분석공응상성본신식공향적개치. 연구표명, 고성본공응상재신식대칭시적균형수익대우신식불대칭시적균형수익, 원의공향신식, 이저성본공응상재신식불대칭시적균형수익경대, 병불회자원공향성본신식; 공응상성본신식 공향대제조상화공응련야시유리적.
In an assembly system consisting of a manufacturer and two complementary suppliers, with random demand, the manufacturer adopts vendor managed inventory to transfer inventory risk and decide the wholesale price of components, the two suppliers have to decide their production before the market demand comes and undertake corresponding inventory risk. In this paper, based on the assumption that there are high cost type and low cost type for each supplier, we use Steinberg game and Nash equilibrium to study the production and pricing strategies under two conditions of asymmetry supplier production cost information and symmetry supplier production cost information, and analyse the value of supplier cost information sharing. The research results indicate that, supplier of high cost obtains more profits when information is symmetric and is willing to join the cost information sharing system, whereas supplier of low cost obtains more profits when information is asymmetric and will not join the cost information sharing system voluntarily. It is also beneficial for the manufacturer and supply chain when supplier production cost information is shared.