系统工程理论与实践
繫統工程理論與實踐
계통공정이론여실천
Systems Engineering—Theory & Practice
2015年
7期
1744~1751
,共null页
周永圣 刘巧荣 李健 赵映雪
週永聖 劉巧榮 李健 趙映雪
주영골 류교영 리건 조영설
绿色信贷 绿色供应链 进化博弈论 政府补贴 政府惩罚
綠色信貸 綠色供應鏈 進化博弈論 政府補貼 政府懲罰
록색신대 록색공응련 진화박혁론 정부보첩 정부징벌
green credit;green supply chain;evolutionary game theory;government subsidies;government penalties;
本文将银行绿色信贷引入到政府促进企业实施绿色供应链中,通过建立政府与银行之间的进化博弈模型,分析了两方参与主体的进化稳定策略. 研究结果表明：当政府的＂审查＂成本大于对银行＂不实施＂绿色信贷的罚款时,政府最终都会选择＂不审查＂;当银行＂实施＂所获得的收益大于＂不实施＂所获得的收益时, 银行最终都会选择＂实施＂;当银行＂不实施＂所获得的收益与＂实施＂所获得的收益之差大于银行＂实施＂所获得补贴与＂不实施＂所获得的罚款之差时,银行最终都会选择＂不实施＂.
本文將銀行綠色信貸引入到政府促進企業實施綠色供應鏈中,通過建立政府與銀行之間的進化博弈模型,分析瞭兩方參與主體的進化穩定策略. 研究結果錶明：噹政府的＂審查＂成本大于對銀行＂不實施＂綠色信貸的罰款時,政府最終都會選擇＂不審查＂;噹銀行＂實施＂所穫得的收益大于＂不實施＂所穫得的收益時, 銀行最終都會選擇＂實施＂;噹銀行＂不實施＂所穫得的收益與＂實施＂所穫得的收益之差大于銀行＂實施＂所穫得補貼與＂不實施＂所穫得的罰款之差時,銀行最終都會選擇＂不實施＂.
본문장은행록색신대인입도정부촉진기업실시록색공응련중,통과건립정부여은행지간적진화박혁모형,분석료량방삼여주체적진화은정책략. 연구결과표명：당정부적＂심사＂성본대우대은행＂불실시＂록색신대적벌관시,정부최종도회선택＂불심사＂;당은행＂실시＂소획득적수익대우＂불실시＂소획득적수익시, 은행최종도회선택＂실시＂;당은행＂불실시＂소획득적수익여＂실시＂소획득적수익지차대우은행＂실시＂소획득보첩여＂불실시＂소획득적벌관지차시,은행최종도회선택＂불실시＂.
This paper introduces the green credit to promote the development of green supply chain. We analyze the evolutionarily stable strategy by establishing evolutionary game model between governments and banks. Research result shows that when the cost of governments＇ examination is greater than the fine on banks＇ non-implement, governments will eventually choose non-examination; when the earnings of banks＇ implementation are more than that of bank＇s non-implementation, banks will eventually select implementation; when the difference of earnings between banks＇ non-implementation and implementation is greater than that between subsidy on implementation and fine on non-implementation, banks will eventually choose non-implementation.
