CAJ | 학술논문

以风险中性制造商和风险规避零售商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,考虑风险规避度和产品绿色度等因素,建立了集中决策博弈模型和制造商领导Stackelberg博弈模型。比较了两博弈模型中,产品绿色度、转移价格、产品价格与风险规避度的相互影响,以及风险规避度对制造商利润和零售商效用的影响。研究表明：（1）在集中决策模型中,零售商的单位产品利润和总利润均为零;（2）在制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型中,随着零售商风险规避度的提高,产品价格会逐渐降低;制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型中的转移价格大于集中决策模型中的转移价格;（3）收益共享契约能够协调绿色供应链。
이풍험중성제조상화풍험규피령수상조성적록색공응련위연구대상,고필풍험규피도화산품록색도등인소,건립료집중결책박혁모형화제조상령도Stackelberg박혁모형。비교료량박혁모형중,산품록색도、전이개격、산품개격여풍험규피도적상호영향,이급풍험규피도대제조상리윤화령수상효용적영향。연구표명：（1）재집중결책모형중,령수상적단위산품리윤화총리윤균위령;（2）재제조상령도적Stackelberg박혁모형중,수착령수상풍험규피도적제고,산품개격회축점강저;제조상령도적Stackelberg박혁모형중적전이개격대우집중결책모형중적전이개격;（3）수익공향계약능구협조록색공응련。
Based on a two-stage green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game models and manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model are established. Comparing the two game models, interaction of product greenness, wholesale prices, product prices and risk aversion and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also discussed. Finally, the reve- nue sharing contract is used to coordinate the green supply chain. Results： In a centralized decision-mak- ing model, the retailer＇s profit per unit and gross profit of products are zero ; in the manufacturer-led Stack- elberg game model, product price will be gradually reduced along with retailers improving the degree of risk aversion; the transfer price in the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model is greater than that in cen- tralized decision-making model; and there are revenue sharing coefficients so that the manufacturer-led green supply chain and the retailer-led green supply chain can be coordinated.