CAJ | 학술논문

论文运用Stackelberg博弈模型,对核心企业和配套企业协同创新进行分析,计算配套企业的最优努力程度,然后在此基础上计算出双方的收益矩阵,并考虑第三方企业的介入对双方选择策略的影响,最后采用数值模拟仿真的方法,以证实均衡点的演化轨迹。研究发现,一般情况下,配套企业与核心企业协同创新是“双贏”的策略。而当集群中第三方企业的介入时,核心企业支付的技术补贴比率与配套企业承担的风险相当时,双方在协同创新处达到稳定均衡。最后提出对策建议。
논문운용Stackelberg박혁모형,대핵심기업화배투기업협동창신진행분석,계산배투기업적최우노력정도,연후재차기출상계산출쌍방적수익구진,병고필제삼방기업적개입대쌍방선택책략적영향,최후채용수치모의방진적방법,이증실균형점적연화궤적。연구발현,일반정황하,배투기업여핵심기업협동창신시“쌍영”적책략。이당집군중제삼방기업적개입시,핵심기업지부적기술보첩비솔여배투기업승담적풍험상당시,쌍방재협동창신처체도은정균형。최후제출대책건의。
The Stackelberg game model is applied to analyze the collaborative innovation among the Core enterprise and Its Supporter and to calculate the optimal effort of supporting enterprises, based on which the payoff matrix of the core enterprise and its supporter is calculated. Then the influence of selection strat- egy of the core enterprise and its supporters with the third party intervention is studied. The evolutionary trace of the equilibrium point is proved by adopting a numerical simulation. The research shows that col- laborative innovation is a win -win strategy, and that the two sides in the collaborative innovation achieve stable equilibrium when there is intervention of the third party in the clusters and the technology subsidies ratio of core enterprise and the risk supporting enterprise bears is equal. Finally, the corresponding coun- termeasures and suggestions are put forward.