CAJ | 학술논문

基于中国的省级面板数据，本文发现，省级信贷投放与固定资产投资都随省委书记和省长的任期呈倒U型变化，转折点在三至四年左右；这种关系在官员退休制度和分税制改革推行后更明显。分税制改革后，官员任期的转折点有所提前，其行为更加短视。与省长相比，倒U型关系对省委书记更显著。本文提供了有关官员任期与经济增长传导机制的重要经验证据，从官员激励角度揭示了中国政治经济周期的内在机制。
기우중국적성급면판수거，본문발현，성급신대투방여고정자산투자도수성위서기화성장적임기정도U형변화，전절점재삼지사년좌우；저충관계재관원퇴휴제도화분세제개혁추행후경명현。분세제개혁후，관원임기적전절점유소제전，기행위경가단시。여성장상비，도U형관계대성위서기경현저。본문제공료유관관원임기여경제증장전도궤제적중요경험증거，종관원격려각도게시료중국정치경제주기적내재궤제。
With the use of the provincial panel data, this paper demonstrates that bank credit and fixed asset investment display an inverse U shape with respect to the local officials＇ tenure and the turning point is around the third or fourth year of the tenure. This relationship becomes more significant after the implementation of the mandatory retirement for officials and the tax reform. Furthermore, the turning point moves forward after the tax reform, reflecting the myopia of local officials. Moreover, compared with provincial governors, the inverse U shape relationship is more evident for provincial secretaries. Our results provide important empirical evidence for the transmission channels about the associations between officials＇ tenure and economic growth, and reveal the underlying mechanisms for China＇ s political business cycles from the perspectives of officials＇ incentives.