CAJ | 학술논문

本文从委托代理理论出发,以715家上海证券交易所A股上市公司为研究样本,构造了中介模型,探讨大股东资金占用对内部控制和企业绩效的影响以及内部控制在其中的中介作用。研究发现,内部控制在大股东资金占用与企业绩效的关系中起完全中介的作用,同时也验证了大股东资金占用对企业绩效的负向影响,支持了＂掏空论＂。本文还分析了模型解释能力的变化,指出了在后续研究中寻找中介变量的必要性。该研究结论为大股东资金占用的监管趋向和追责模式提供了理论依据,对上市公司加强内部控制也有一定的指导意义。
본문종위탁대리이론출발,이715가상해증권교역소A고상시공사위연구양본,구조료중개모형,탐토대고동자금점용대내부공제화기업적효적영향이급내부공제재기중적중개작용。연구발현,내부공제재대고동자금점용여기업적효적관계중기완전중개적작용,동시야험증료대고동자금점용대기업적효적부향영향,지지료＂도공론＂。본문환분석료모형해석능력적변화,지출료재후속연구중심조중개변량적필요성。해연구결론위대고동자금점용적감관추향화추책모식제공료이론의거,대상시공사가강내부공제야유일정적지도의의。
Based on a sample of 715 A share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange,this paper draws on a principal-agent theory and establishes a mediating model to investigate the influence of large shareholder expropriation on firm performance and the mediating effect of internal control. The results show that the impact of large shareholder expropriation on firm performance is fully mediated by internal control. It is also suggested that large shareholder expropriation positively associated with firm performance,which supports the ＂tunneling theory＂. In addition,this paper analyzes the variation of R2,pointing out the necessity of looking mediating variable in subsequent research. The conclusion provides a theoretical basis for large shareholder expropriation regulatory trends and responsibility pattern,providing some guidance on companies＇ internal control.