CAJ | 학술논문

城市群创新主体交流沟通是其产生协同意愿的充分条件,会影响协同稳定性和系统演化结果。构建了城市群创新主体协同交流博弈模型,分析了创新主体交流动因,并用间接演化方法探讨了其协同稳定性问题,认为创新利润是直接的协同动因,同质和异质性创新主体协同会影响协同意愿,且其规模差异及条件等因素综合影响演化路径。最后对城市群创新主体协同保障机制进行了分析,并提出了相应的对策建议。
성시군창신주체교류구통시기산생협동의원적충분조건,회영향협동은정성화계통연화결과。구건료성시군창신주체협동교류박혁모형,분석료창신주체교류동인,병용간접연화방법탐토료기협동은정성문제,인위창신리윤시직접적협동동인,동질화이질성창신주체협동회영향협동의원,차기규모차이급조건등인소종합영향연화로경。최후대성시군창신주체협동보장궤제진행료분석,병제출료상응적대책건의。
Communication among the innovators of the urban agglomeration is a sufficient condition for the synergy inten- tion,it would affect the synergy stability and the result of system evolution. Structures a synergy communication game model between innovators, analyzes their communicate agent, discusses the synergistic stability using the indirect evolu- tion. The conclusion is that the innovation profit would be the direct synergy motivation,the homogeneous and heterogene- ous innovators would affect the synergy willingness,and the main scale difference, condition and others affect the evolution path comprehensively. At last analyzes the synergy mechanism of the innovator and puts out the corresponding policy sug- gestion. K