CAJ | 학술논문

之前的研究发现负债融资阻碍了企业的R＆D投资,本文从债权人监督的角度对负债融资与R＆D投资之间的关系进行进一步的解释。本文研究发现,受到债权人监督较少的商业信用对企业的R＆D投资几乎没有影响,而受到监督较多的银行信贷则严重阻碍了R＆D投资。然而,在银行信贷监督较少的国有企业以及自有资金较多的企业中,银行信贷却不会影响企业的R＆D投资。本文的研究结果表明,负债融资对R＆D投资的影响效果受到债权人监督能力的影响,监督力强的债权人更有能力影响企业的决策,从而导致企业R＆D投资的减少,而监督力弱的债权人则不会影响企业的R＆D投资。
지전적연구발현부채융자조애료기업적R＆D투자,본문종채권인감독적각도대부채융자여R＆D투자지간적관계진행진일보적해석。본문연구발현,수도채권인감독교소적상업신용대기업적R＆D투자궤호몰유영향,이수도감독교다적은행신대칙엄중조애료R＆D투자。연이,재은행신대감독교소적국유기업이급자유자금교다적기업중,은행신대각불회영향기업적R＆D투자。본문적연구결과표명,부채융자대R＆D투자적영향효과수도채권인감독능력적영향,감독력강적채권인경유능력영향기업적결책,종이도치기업R＆D투자적감소,이감독력약적채권인칙불회영향기업적R＆D투자。
Previous literature finds that debt impedes firm＇s R＆D investment. This paper explains the relation between debt financ- ing and R＆D investment from side of creditor supervision. The result shows that there is no effect of trade credit, which receives less credi- tor supervision, on R＆D investment. But the bank loan, always receives more supervision, impedes in＇ms＇ R＆D investment severely. However, the result also shows that R＆D investment in state - owned firms and in firms with more cash, the proxy for finns receives less bank supervision, is not affected by bank loan. The result suggests that the relation between debt financing and R＆D investment is affected by creditor supervision, the creditors with more supervision have more ability affect finn investment decision, and thereby impede R＆D investment, but creditors with less supervision have no ability affect finns R＆D investment.