CAJ | 학술논문

本文从外商直接投资（FDI）与环境之间的关系入手，结合“污染避难所”有关假说，在FDI区位选择理论中加入地方政府环境规制因素。从理论和实证的角度分析是否存在地方政府以降低环境规制为手段策略性争夺FDI以及地方政府环境规制“竞争到底”（race-to-bottom）的事实。基于2005年至2013年28个省区的面板数据，本文对以上两个假说进行实证检验。根据经验分析结果，地方政府降低环境规制水平的确能够吸引更多的FDI，出于辖区利益最大化的目标，地方政府有动机降低环境规制水平；考察环境规制策略性的空间计量模型显示，地方政府之间的环境政策博弈的确存在着“竞争到底”的特征。
본문종외상직접투자（FDI）여배경지간적관계입수，결합“오염피난소”유관가설，재FDI구위선택이론중가입지방정부배경규제인소。종이론화실증적각도분석시부존재지방정부이강저배경규제위수단책략성쟁탈FDI이급지방정부배경규제“경쟁도저”（race-to-bottom）적사실。기우2005년지2013년28개성구적면판수거，본문대이상량개가설진행실증검험。근거경험분석결과，지방정부강저배경규제수평적학능구흡인경다적FDI，출우할구이익최대화적목표，지방정부유동궤강저배경규제수평；고찰배경규제책략성적공간계량모형현시，지방정부지간적배경정책박혁적학존재착“경쟁도저”적특정。
Inspired by the related hypothesis about the pollution heaven, the paper introduces environmental regulations of Chinese local governments into the theory of the FDI location choice. The paper examines whether or not the local governrnents exhibit behaviors that lower the environmental regulation standards deliberately in order to win the FDI location competition （race- to- bottom） both empirically and theoretically. Based on the data of 28 provinces, from the year 2005 to the year 2008, this paper employs fixed- effects model first to deter- mine the influences of the environmental regulations in FDI choice of foreign en- terprise and then uses the spatial autoregressive model to examine the behaviors of the local governments. The result shows that the lower the environmental regu- lation standard is, the more FDI the local government attracts. Therefore, the gov- ernments have strong motives to lower the regulation standards to maximize the region＇ s profits. The spatial autoregressive model results show that the “race- to- bottom”fact holds as what is suggested in the previous discussion.