CAJ | 학술논문

2007年中国开始实行国有资本红利上缴政策，终结了国企只纳税不向政府上缴利润的历史。但是由于政府与国有企业内部人信息的不对称，国企内部人必然会产生道德风险问题，即将利润进行转移。运用委托代理博弈模型，分别考察了红利上缴前后，政府与企业内部人的行为。通过对模型最优解的分析，论证了国企红利上缴的必要性，发现在上缴比例扩大及企业内部人违规成本上升的情况下，政府收入成倒“U”型变化，同时国企内部人的利润转移程度呈现下降趋势；并且在国企红利征缴比例倍增的情况下，依据不同国企的经营状况，对不同行业征收不同的最优比例；另外降低企业内部人的薪资待遇，也能防止利润转移程度的扩大。
2007년중국개시실행국유자본홍리상격정책，종결료국기지납세불향정부상격리윤적역사。단시유우정부여국유기업내부인신식적불대칭，국기내부인필연회산생도덕풍험문제，즉장리윤진행전이。운용위탁대리박혁모형，분별고찰료홍리상격전후，정부여기업내부인적행위。통과대모형최우해적분석，론증료국기홍리상격적필요성，발현재상격비례확대급기업내부인위규성본상승적정황하，정부수입성도“U”형변화，동시국기내부인적리윤전이정도정현하강추세；병차재국기홍리정격비례배증적정황하，의거불동국기적경영상황，대불동행업정수불동적최우비례；령외강저기업내부인적신자대우，야능방지리윤전이정도적확대。
Since 2007, the payment of state-owned enterprises＇ profits of policy has been adopted, the history that state-owned enterprises only pay tax and needn＇ t pay interest has changed. The moral hazard of the state - owned enterprises internal management came from the asymmetric information between the government and the state-owned enterprises＇ internal management. The paper used the principal-agent model to analyse the behaviors of the government and the state-owned enterprises＇ management which is based on inspecting before and after divi- dend paid. The analysis implied the necessity of the payment of the profits and the relationship between dividend in- come and payout ratio is inverted U-shape. The government should constitute different payment ratio of state-owned enterprises＇ profits according to different industries. To reduce the enterprise managers＇ salary can also decrease the shifting profit.