CAJ | 학술논문

国有企业和私有企业(公私) 之间的并购与融合被认为是新一轮国资国企改革的重头戏, 但地方政府的保护主义等干预行为严重阻碍了公私并购的成功, 而地方国有企业之间的异地并购经常被认为是相比公私并购更易被突破的一环, 但地方政府在面临地方国有企业之间并购时存在着复杂的动态博弈, 并购行为能否达成存在争议. 文章将构建四个参与主体的三阶段动态博弈模型来分析在存在财政竞争压力和经济外部性可以得到控制的条件下, 这种并购行为可以达成, 博弈可以得到均衡解, 同时文章还分析了博弈无解的情况.
국유기업화사유기업(공사) 지간적병구여융합피인위시신일륜국자국기개혁적중두희, 단지방정부적보호주의등간예행위엄중조애료공사병구적성공, 이지방국유기업지간적이지병구경상피인위시상비공사병구경역피돌파적일배, 단지방정부재면림지방국유기업지간병구시존재착복잡적동태박혁, 병구행위능부체성존재쟁의. 문장장구건사개삼여주체적삼계단동태박혁모형래분석재존재재정경쟁압력화경제외부성가이득도공제적조건하, 저충병구행위가이체성, 박혁가이득도균형해, 동시문장환분석료박혁무해적정황.
The mergers and fusion between the state-owned enterprises and private enterprises(public and private) is considered the key of a new round of reform, but the local government protectionism has seriously hindered the public and private mergers and acquisitions, and mergers between local state-owned enterprises in different places is often considered to be easier than a public-private merger. However, there is a complex dynamic game when the local government faces the mergers and acquisitions between the local state-owned enterprises, there have been disputes about whether mergers and acquisitions can reach consensus. This paper will study the merger behavior that can be reached by constructing four players in the three stage dynamic game model to analyze the existing fiscal competition and economic externalities that can be obtained under controlled conditions and also the game equilibrium solution is obtained.