西北师范大学学报(社会科学版)
西北師範大學學報(社會科學版)
서북사범대학학보(사회과학판)
Journal of Northwest Normal University (Social Sciences)
2015年
5期
137-144
,共8页
政府采购%企业合谋%T ullock集体寻租博弈
政府採購%企業閤謀%T ullock集體尋租博弈
정부채구%기업합모%T ullock집체심조박혁
government procurement%enterprise conspiracy%T ullock collective rent seeking game
政府采购制度是我国财政领域和公共品提供机制上的一次重大制度创新,使其在强化政府宏观调控能力、增强财政监督职能和节约财政支出等方面起到了积极作用。但是,由于制度设计的“漏洞”,政府采购领域存在着寻租现象,其中一种寻租的类型是企业合谋竞租。利用拓展的T ullock集体寻租博弈模型,对政府采购过程中参与要素的建模及对模型的解构分析,发现:其一,政府采购中企业合谋竞标是企业在目前竞标情景下,基于自身利益做出的理性选择。联盟形成后,联盟规模与联盟内部规则中平均主义要素比例和整个政府采购中参与竞标的经销商数量呈负相关关系。其二,从整个社会的角度来看,企业的合谋行为悄无声息地规避了政府采购中竞争性制度设计,在我们无法彻底将寻租活动从政府采购中消灭的时候,直接针对这种合谋行为的规制是降低政府采购活动给社会带来无谓损失的有效手段。
政府採購製度是我國財政領域和公共品提供機製上的一次重大製度創新,使其在彊化政府宏觀調控能力、增彊財政鑑督職能和節約財政支齣等方麵起到瞭積極作用。但是,由于製度設計的“漏洞”,政府採購領域存在著尋租現象,其中一種尋租的類型是企業閤謀競租。利用拓展的T ullock集體尋租博弈模型,對政府採購過程中參與要素的建模及對模型的解構分析,髮現:其一,政府採購中企業閤謀競標是企業在目前競標情景下,基于自身利益做齣的理性選擇。聯盟形成後,聯盟規模與聯盟內部規則中平均主義要素比例和整箇政府採購中參與競標的經銷商數量呈負相關關繫。其二,從整箇社會的角度來看,企業的閤謀行為悄無聲息地規避瞭政府採購中競爭性製度設計,在我們無法徹底將尋租活動從政府採購中消滅的時候,直接針對這種閤謀行為的規製是降低政府採購活動給社會帶來無謂損失的有效手段。
정부채구제도시아국재정영역화공공품제공궤제상적일차중대제도창신,사기재강화정부굉관조공능력、증강재정감독직능화절약재정지출등방면기도료적겁작용。단시,유우제도설계적“루동”,정부채구영역존재착심조현상,기중일충심조적류형시기업합모경조。이용탁전적T ullock집체심조박혁모형,대정부채구과정중삼여요소적건모급대모형적해구분석,발현:기일,정부채구중기업합모경표시기업재목전경표정경하,기우자신이익주출적이성선택。련맹형성후,련맹규모여련맹내부규칙중평균주의요소비례화정개정부채구중삼여경표적경소상수량정부상관관계。기이,종정개사회적각도래간,기업적합모행위초무성식지규피료정부채구중경쟁성제도설계,재아문무법철저장심조활동종정부채구중소멸적시후,직접침대저충합모행위적규제시강저정부채구활동급사회대래무위손실적유효수단。
T he government procurement system is a major institutional innovation in Chinese financial sector and the public goods supply mechanism . It has played a positive role in strengthening the government macroeconomic regulation , controlling the ability of financial supervision function and fiscal expenditure saving , and etc . However , there exists a phenomenon of rent seeking due to the vulnerability of the system design . One type of rent seeking is conspiring to rent seeking enterprises . This paper analyzed the elements of participation in the government procurement process ,in modeling and analyzing model of deconstruction by T ullock collective rent seeking game model , and found:First , the enterprise conspired bidding in government procurement is a kind of rational choice based on their ow n interests under current scenario . After the formation of the union , the union rules egalitarianism elements in proportion and the entire government procurement bid showed a negative correlation between the number of dealers . Second , from the point of view of the w hole society , the enterprise conspiracy behavior evades the competitive system design of the government procurement quietly . If we can not completely eliminate the rent seeking activities in government procurement , regulations forbidding the collusion behavior is the best ways to reduce deadweight loss to society caused by the rent seeking activities in the procurement .