CAJ | 학술논문

在绿色产品质量监管中，政府以提升绿色产品质量安全为目标，第三方认证机构及企业则希望利用现有资源获得最大收益。在信息不对称条件下，第三方认证机构与企业容易发生权利寻租问题。有效解决权利寻租问题是保障绿色产品质量的关键，研究政府、第三方认证机构及企业三者共同参与的监管策略，可为制定符合实际情况的监管对策提供依据。本文首先阐述了政府、第三方与企业各自的职责，政府监管企业生产行为，第三方获得认证后监管企业并受政府监督。在此基础上，建立了政府、第三方与企业关系概念模型，分析三者相互作用的内在机理。其次，运用博弈理论，构建了第三方与企业、政府与第三方及政府与企业间博弈模型，并进行混合策略Nash均衡求解及策略选择分析，研究了影响政府监督、不监督，企业寻租、不寻租，第三方接受寻租、拒绝寻租行为策略的关键因素。再次，重点讨论了政府、第三方与企业三者共同参与的寻租博弈模型，详细阐述了第三方与企业发生权力寻租、政府监督二者寻租行为的影响因素。研究结果表明：①绿色产品质量监管中的寻租行为与政府的监管能力系数、付出成本、对第三方和企业的惩罚力度有关。政府通过降低监管的成本，提高监管能力，加大对第三方与企业寻租行为的经济惩罚，能有效避免二者间的权利寻租行为。②在提高政府监管二者寻租行为效率方面，分为两种情况。当把第三方利益放在第一位时，政府应减少第三方寻租的额外经济收益，提高政府监督的能力系数，同时加大对第三方发生寻租行为的经济处罚；当把企业利益放在首位时，政府应提高企业与第三方权利寻租的成本，加大对违规企业的经济处罚。最后，给出了政府提高绿色产品质量监管效率，妥善处理博弈各方的利益诉求，避免第三方与企业权力寻租的措施。在綠色產品質量鑑管中，政府以提升綠色產品質量安全為目標，第三方認證機構及企業則希望利用現有資源穫得最大收益。在信息不對稱條件下，第三方認證機構與企業容易髮生權利尋租問題。有效解決權利尋租問題是保障綠色產品質量的關鍵，研究政府、第三方認證機構及企業三者共同參與的鑑管策略，可為製定符閤實際情況的鑑管對策提供依據。本文首先闡述瞭政府、第三方與企業各自的職責，政府鑑管企業生產行為，第三方穫得認證後鑑管企業併受政府鑑督。在此基礎上，建立瞭政府、第三方與企業關繫概唸模型，分析三者相互作用的內在機理。其次，運用博弈理論，構建瞭第三方與企業、政府與第三方及政府與企業間博弈模型，併進行混閤策略Nash均衡求解及策略選擇分析，研究瞭影響政府鑑督、不鑑督，企業尋租、不尋租，第三方接受尋租、拒絕尋租行為策略的關鍵因素。再次，重點討論瞭政府、第三方與企業三者共同參與的尋租博弈模型，詳細闡述瞭第三方與企業髮生權力尋租、政府鑑督二者尋租行為的影響因素。研究結果錶明：①綠色產品質量鑑管中的尋租行為與政府的鑑管能力繫數、付齣成本、對第三方和企業的懲罰力度有關。政府通過降低鑑管的成本，提高鑑管能力，加大對第三方與企業尋租行為的經濟懲罰，能有效避免二者間的權利尋租行為。②在提高政府鑑管二者尋租行為效率方麵，分為兩種情況。噹把第三方利益放在第一位時，政府應減少第三方尋租的額外經濟收益，提高政府鑑督的能力繫數，同時加大對第三方髮生尋租行為的經濟處罰；噹把企業利益放在首位時，政府應提高企業與第三方權利尋租的成本，加大對違規企業的經濟處罰。最後，給齣瞭政府提高綠色產品質量鑑管效率，妥善處理博弈各方的利益訴求，避免第三方與企業權力尋租的措施。
재록색산품질량감관중，정부이제승록색산품질량안전위목표，제삼방인증궤구급기업칙희망이용현유자원획득최대수익。재신식불대칭조건하，제삼방인증궤구여기업용역발생권리심조문제。유효해결권리심조문제시보장록색산품질량적관건，연구정부、제삼방인증궤구급기업삼자공동삼여적감관책략，가위제정부합실제정황적감관대책제공의거。본문수선천술료정부、제삼방여기업각자적직책，정부감관기업생산행위，제삼방획득인증후감관기업병수정부감독。재차기출상，건립료정부、제삼방여기업관계개념모형，분석삼자상호작용적내재궤리。기차，운용박혁이론，구건료제삼방여기업、정부여제삼방급정부여기업간박혁모형，병진행혼합책략Nash균형구해급책략선택분석，연구료영향정부감독、불감독，기업심조、불심조，제삼방접수심조、거절심조행위책략적관건인소。재차，중점토론료정부、제삼방여기업삼자공동삼여적심조박혁모형，상세천술료제삼방여기업발생권력심조、정부감독이자심조행위적영향인소。연구결과표명：①록색산품질량감관중적심조행위여정부적감관능력계수、부출성본、대제삼방화기업적징벌력도유관。정부통과강저감관적성본，제고감관능력，가대대제삼방여기업심조행위적경제징벌，능유효피면이자간적권리심조행위。②재제고정부감관이자심조행위효솔방면，분위량충정황。당파제삼방이익방재제일위시，정부응감소제삼방심조적액외경제수익，제고정부감독적능력계수，동시가대대제삼방발생심조행위적경제처벌；당파기업이익방재수위시，정부응제고기업여제삼방권리심조적성본，가대대위규기업적경제처벌。최후，급출료정부제고록색산품질량감관효솔，타선처리박혁각방적이익소구，피면제삼방여기업권력심조적조시。
In quality regulation of green products, the government takes the quality of green products as the goal, the third-party certification institution and enterprise hope to use the existing resources to obtain the maximum benefits. Under asymmetric information, the third-party certification institution and enterprise is prone to adopt rent-seeking. Government seeking an effective solution to the problem is an important prerequisite to protect the quality of green products. Considering the participation jointly of quality regulation behavior strategy can provide the basis for the development of regulatory countermeasures in line with the actual situation. Firstly, this paper gives the respective duties of the government, the enterprise and the third-party. Government regulates the enterprise production behavior;the third party after obtaining the certification supervises the enterprise, and then is to be regulated by the government. Based on this, the conceptual model is constructed to analyze the internal mechanism among the government, third-party and enterprise. Secondly, the game models of the third party and enterprise, the government and third-party, the government and enterprise are built, which study the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium. Then the key factors of the government regulation or not regulation, the enterprise rent-seeking or not rent-seeking, the third-party accept rent-seeking or refuse to rent-seeking behavior strategies are analyzed. Again, the discussion is focused on the tripartite game in the rent-seeking, which elaborated the strategy behaviors of government, the third party and enterprise. The results show that the rent-seeking behavior of green products is related with the regulatory capacity coefficient,the regulation cost of the government and the penalties on the third-party and enterprise. Reducing the cost of government regulation, improving the regulatory capacity, and increasing financial penalties of the third-party and enterprise can effectively prevent the rent-seeking between them. In terms of improving the regulation efficiency of government,there are two cases. When placing the interests of the third-party in the first place, the government should reduce the additional economic seeking benefits of the third-party, improve the capacity of regulation, and increase financial penalties rent-seeking behavior of the third-party; when placing the interests of enterprise in the first place, the government should not only enhance the cost of rent-seeking, but also increase the financial penalties for illegal enterprise. Finally the recommendations are put forward for the governments including to strengthening the regulation capacity of green products, properly handling the demands of the game of the parties, and avoiding the third party and the enterprise rent-seeking.