CAJ | 학술논문

基于异质产品 Stackelberg 寡头竞争模型，建立了拥有新产品创新技术在位厂商与潜在竞争对手间的技术许可博弈模型。模型中假设潜在竞争对手可以接受许可，也可通过自我研发创新技术进入市场参与竞争。根据潜在竞争对手研发成本的高低，研究了创新厂商的最优两部制收费策略。研究结果表明：潜在竞争者总会接受创新技术许可，最优许可策略依赖于研发成本、市场参数以及产品的替代系数。
기우이질산품 Stackelberg 과두경쟁모형，건립료옹유신산품창신기술재위엄상여잠재경쟁대수간적기술허가박혁모형。모형중가설잠재경쟁대수가이접수허가，야가통과자아연발창신기술진입시장삼여경쟁。근거잠재경쟁대수연발성본적고저，연구료창신엄상적최우량부제수비책략。연구결과표명：잠재경쟁자총회접수창신기술허가，최우허가책략의뢰우연발성본、시장삼수이급산품적체대계수。
Based on a differentiated Stackelberg duopoly,this paper established a licensing game model in which an in-cumbent innovator competing with a potential rival can develop the technology for the new product,or accept the licensing to enter the market.Depending on the two scenarios for the development cost,the optimal two-part tariff licensing strategies for the innovator were investigated.It concludes that the technology is always licensed and the optimal licensing contract depends on the development cost incurred by the rival,the market parameter and the substitution coefficient.