CAJ | 학술논문

本文基于企业股权结构的视角，量化分析了我国上市公司参股银行和参与影子银行的行为。从整体结论来看，本文发现控股股东的股权结构影响了上市公司参股银行和参与影子银行的积极性；参股银行提高了上市公司获取银行贷款的能力，进而为上市公司参与影子银行提供了充足的资源。具体而言，我们发现参股银行对上市公司具有短暂的价值增加信号效应，市场对上市公司参与影子银行持负面的态度。受“短期侵占动机”的驱动，两权分离严重的控股股东不倾向于企业参股银行。在参与影子银行过程中，控股股东的“资金配置动机”超过了其“外部盈利动机”，股权结构的差异也影响了上市公司参与影子银行的风险承担水平。
본문기우기업고권결구적시각，양화분석료아국상시공사삼고은행화삼여영자은행적행위。종정체결론래간，본문발현공고고동적고권결구영향료상시공사삼고은행화삼여영자은행적적겁성；삼고은행제고료상시공사획취은행대관적능력，진이위상시공사삼여영자은행제공료충족적자원。구체이언，아문발현삼고은행대상시공사구유단잠적개치증가신호효응，시장대상시공사삼여영자은행지부면적태도。수“단기침점동궤”적구동，량권분리엄중적공고고동불경향우기업삼고은행。재삼여영자은행과정중，공고고동적“자금배치동궤”초과료기“외부영리동궤”，고권결구적차이야영향료상시공사삼여영자은행적풍험승담수평。
From the perspective of firm’s ownership structure, this paper empirically studies the behaviors of holding bank ownership and participating in shadow banking with the data of Chinese listed firms.From the main conclusion, we find that the ownership structure impacts the enthusiasm of the listed firms to hold bank ownership and participate in shadow banking.Holding bank ownership improves firm’s ability to get more bank loans which provides firms with plenty of resources for their participation in the shadow banking.Specifically, we find that the behavior of participating in shadow banking provides listed firms with briefly value-increase signal effect and the market shows negative attitude to this behavior.Motived by the “short -term embezzlement motivation”, the firm whose controlling shareholder with higher separation of ownership and control right does not incline to hold bank ownership.In the process of participating in shadow banking,“capital allocation motivation” of the controlling shareholder dominates his“external profit motivation” and the differences of ownership structure have significant impact on the risk taking level in firms’ participation of shadow banking.