电子与信息学报
電子與信息學報
전자여신식학보
Journal of Electronics & Information Technology
2015年
10期
2431-2437
,共7页
蔡世杰%肖立民%王京%周世东
蔡世傑%肖立民%王京%週世東
채세걸%초립민%왕경%주세동
蜂窝网络%WiFi覆盖%业务分担%用户移动%激励机制
蜂窩網絡%WiFi覆蓋%業務分擔%用戶移動%激勵機製
봉와망락%WiFi복개%업무분담%용호이동%격려궤제
Cellular network%WiFi coverage%Traffic offloading%Users’ mobility%Incentive mechanism
WiFi网络可以分担蜂窝网络的通信业务压力,缓解其拥塞状况。然而,WiFi网络的业务分担只能在其覆盖范围内进行。由于用户具有移动性,如果通过提供一些奖励引导WiFi网络覆盖范围之外的用户延迟其在蜂窝网络中的业务、直至其进入WiFi覆盖区再接受服务,WiFi网络的业务分担能力将得到显著提升。该文探讨了运营商通过激励机制鼓励用户延迟其蜂窝网络业务转而接入 WiFi 网络的过程,并将其建模为两阶段斯塔克博格(Stackelberg)博弈。在该博弈中,运营商期望采取最优的奖励方案,能够兼顾蜂窝网络拥塞和付出的用户奖励。该文推导出了运营商的最优奖励方案。数值结果表明,所提激励机制可以有效降低包括蜂窝网络拥塞代价和奖励用户代价在内的运营商总代价。
WiFi網絡可以分擔蜂窩網絡的通信業務壓力,緩解其擁塞狀況。然而,WiFi網絡的業務分擔隻能在其覆蓋範圍內進行。由于用戶具有移動性,如果通過提供一些獎勵引導WiFi網絡覆蓋範圍之外的用戶延遲其在蜂窩網絡中的業務、直至其進入WiFi覆蓋區再接受服務,WiFi網絡的業務分擔能力將得到顯著提升。該文探討瞭運營商通過激勵機製鼓勵用戶延遲其蜂窩網絡業務轉而接入 WiFi 網絡的過程,併將其建模為兩階段斯塔剋博格(Stackelberg)博弈。在該博弈中,運營商期望採取最優的獎勵方案,能夠兼顧蜂窩網絡擁塞和付齣的用戶獎勵。該文推導齣瞭運營商的最優獎勵方案。數值結果錶明,所提激勵機製可以有效降低包括蜂窩網絡擁塞代價和獎勵用戶代價在內的運營商總代價。
WiFi망락가이분담봉와망락적통신업무압력,완해기옹새상황。연이,WiFi망락적업무분담지능재기복개범위내진행。유우용호구유이동성,여과통과제공일사장려인도WiFi망락복개범위지외적용호연지기재봉와망락중적업무、직지기진입WiFi복개구재접수복무,WiFi망락적업무분담능력장득도현저제승。해문탐토료운영상통과격려궤제고려용호연지기봉와망락업무전이접입 WiFi 망락적과정,병장기건모위량계단사탑극박격(Stackelberg)박혁。재해박혁중,운영상기망채취최우적장려방안,능구겸고봉와망락옹새화부출적용호장려。해문추도출료운영상적최우장려방안。수치결과표명,소제격려궤제가이유효강저포괄봉와망락옹새대개화장려용호대개재내적운영상총대개。
WiFi network helps offload the traffic pressure in cellular networks and alleviate its traffic congestion. However, it can merely offload the traffic within its coverage. In view of the mobility of users, if the users beyond WiFi coverage are incentivized with certain rewards to postpone their present cellular network services, and wait till they enter WiFi coverage, the traffic offloading capacity of WiFi Network will be significantly enhanced. This paper discusses an incentive mechanism for the operator to encourage users to delay their cellular network services and switch to WiFi network, and formulates the problem as a two-stage Stackelberg game. In this game, an operator expects to adopt an optimum reward solution, giving considerations to the extent of cellular network congestion and the required reward for users. Optimal reward mechanisms for the operators are proposed. According to the research result, the proposed incentive mechanism can effectively reduce the total costs of operators including the cellular network congestion costs and the user reward costs.