CAJ | 학술논문

以操纵性应计利润衡量盈余管理程度，以我国上市企业2007—2013年数据为样本，实证分析了CEO综合权力及不同权力维度变量对盈余管理的影响。研究结果表明，我国上市企业的CEO综合权力越大，企业盈余管理程度越高，权力大的CEO越可能实施正向盈余管理。较高的股权集中度和董事会独立性能够减少CEO利用权力实施盈余管理的行为，持有股份越多的CEO越不可能实施盈余管理。
이조종성응계리윤형량영여관리정도，이아국상시기업2007—2013년수거위양본，실증분석료CEO종합권력급불동권력유도변량대영여관리적영향。연구결과표명，아국상시기업적CEO종합권력월대，기업영여관리정도월고，권력대적CEO월가능실시정향영여관리。교고적고권집중도화동사회독립성능구감소CEO이용권력실시영여관리적행위，지유고빈월다적CEO월불가능실시영여관리。
Based on the sample of listed firms in China during the period 2007-2013, the impact of CEO power on earning management was investigated while discretionary accruals were employed as measurement of earning management.The results show that the CEO power has significantly positive impact on earning management;the CEOs with strong powers are more likely to implement positive earning management.The higher ownership concentration and board independence can decrease earning man-agement of CEOs.The CEOs who own stake are less likely to implement earning management.