CAJ | 학술논문

市场的有效治理依赖于契约，尽管新古典经济学内含契约完全性假设，但现实中的契约大部分是不完全的。不完全契约的实施主要依赖于自我履约机制，而非传统范式所言的第三方强制，研究契约的自我实施机制对于深化契约治理的理论认识、优化经济主体的契约设计和提升市场治理效率有着重要意义。在介绍不完全契约与自我履约机制本质规定性的基础上，本文从资产专用性、激励、惩罚、声誉和社会资本等方面，对不完全契约自我实施的作用机制进行了文献梳理，在简述现有研究局限的基础上展望了未来研究的扩展方向。
시장적유효치리의뢰우계약，진관신고전경제학내함계약완전성가설，단현실중적계약대부분시불완전적。불완전계약적실시주요의뢰우자아리약궤제，이비전통범식소언적제삼방강제，연구계약적자아실시궤제대우심화계약치리적이론인식、우화경제주체적계약설계화제승시장치리효솔유착중요의의。재개소불완전계약여자아리약궤제본질규정성적기출상，본문종자산전용성、격려、징벌、성예화사회자본등방면，대불완전계약자아실시적작용궤제진행료문헌소리，재간술현유연구국한적기출상전망료미래연구적확전방향。
An efficient governance of the market heavily relies on the effectiveness of contracts. Although the new classi-cal economics encloses the completeness assumption of contract, but the most are incomplete contracts in reality. The im-plementation of the incomplete contracts depends upon self-enforcement mechanism mainly rather than unconventional enforcement by a third party. Analyzing the self-enforcement mechanism is critical for playing an essential role in deepe-ning theoretical recognition, optimizing the contract design as well as improving the efficiency of market governance. This paper reviews several articles by discussing the self-enforcement mechanism of the incomplete contract and nature regula-tion in terms of its assets specificity, incentive system, punishment penalty, reputation and social capital. What is more, the paper predicts the future trend of research projects.