CAJ | 학술논문

本文选取高新技术企业为研究样本，检验CTO持股和CEO-CTO薪酬差距对企业研发投入的影响，结果表明CTO持股比例越高有利于企业研发投入的增加； CEO-CTO薪酬差距促进CTO的工作积极性，也会促使企业研发投入的提升； CTO持股与CTO晋升存在着替代效应，晋升比持股所产生的激励效果更为明显； CTO持股的激励效果在非国有企业中更加明显。
본문선취고신기술기업위연구양본，검험CTO지고화CEO-CTO신수차거대기업연발투입적영향，결과표명CTO지고비례월고유리우기업연발투입적증가； CEO-CTO신수차거촉진CTO적공작적겁성，야회촉사기업연발투입적제승； CTO지고여CTO진승존재착체대효응，진승비지고소산생적격려효과경위명현； CTO지고적격려효과재비국유기업중경가명현。
Based on high and new technology enterprises′data, this paper studies the influence of CTO stockholding and pay dispersion between CEO and CTO on R&D investment. The results show that with the increase of the rate of CTO share holding, R&D investment will increase at the same time. The pay dispersion between CEO and CTO has positive influence on R&D investment significantly. As the pay gap between CEO and CTO widens, CTO would prefer to work harder. CTO stock incentive and CTO promotion incentive have substitution effect on R&D investment. Furthermore, CTO promotion incentive plays a larger role than CTO stock incentive on R&D investment. CTO shareholding incentive on R&D investment is more obvious in the non-state-owned enterprises.