CAJ | 학술논문

本文通过构建一个民间借贷规制模型来分析需求弹性和行政执法成本对规制效率的影响。模型表明：在民间借贷缺乏需求弹性时，由于高昂的禁令规制成本，对政府而言更为合适的手段是将民间借贷采取合法化、并加以征税的规制政策。在我国，除了通过“民间借贷服务中心”等机构创新来实现民间金融规范化以外，更主要地是打破金融机构市场准入高度管控的体制，允许民间资本进入金融业，使民间金融机构合法化。
본문통과구건일개민간차대규제모형래분석수구탄성화행정집법성본대규제효솔적영향。모형표명：재민간차대결핍수구탄성시，유우고앙적금령규제성본，대정부이언경위합괄적수단시장민간차대채취합법화、병가이정세적규제정책。재아국，제료통과“민간차대복무중심”등궤구창신래실현민간금융규범화이외，경주요지시타파금융궤구시장준입고도관공적체제，윤허민간자본진입금융업，사민간금융궤구합법화。
This paper analyzes the effects of the demand elasticity and the cost of administrative enforcement of law on the efficiency of regulation through a model of private lending market.The research shows that: under the condition that private lending lacks demand elasticity, due to the high cost of regulation, a more appropriate method that the government should a-dopt is to legalize private lending and pursue a regulation policy of taxation.In China, besides using such mechanism innova-tion means as“private lending service center” to regulate private finance, the government should put more emphasis on break-ing up the old system of strict regulation of market access, so as to allow private capital to enter the financial industry and le-galize the private financial institutions.