重庆理工大学学报(社会科学版)
重慶理工大學學報(社會科學版)
중경리공대학학보(사회과학판)
Journal of Chongqing Institute of Technology
2015年
10期
45-52
,共8页
公平偏好%激励契约%双重信息不对称%逆向选择
公平偏好%激勵契約%雙重信息不對稱%逆嚮選擇
공평편호%격려계약%쌍중신식불대칭%역향선택
fairness preference%incentive contract%double information asymmetry%adverse selection
传统的逆向选择模型建立在代理人“纯粹自利”的假设基础之上,忽略了人的公平心理偏好对激励契约的影响。从个体心理偏好的异质性出发,将作为隐藏信息的公平偏好心理因素嵌入传统逆向选择模型,设计出当代理人能力水平和心理偏好特征均为私有信息时的最优契约,可以发现公平偏好以及双重逆向选择的信息结构对于最优激励契约及其实施效率的影响。结果表明:双重逆向选择情形下最优契约是“部分混同”的,而公平心理会导致部分代理人通过隐藏其真实心理偏好以获取额外信息租金。最优契约是在信息租金抽取、公平心理补偿与配置效率之间权衡产生的结果,因此与传统的逆向选择情形相比,公平偏好会导致低能力代理人的配置向下扭曲变大,而不同能力代理人之间的收入差距会随公平心理强度增加而增大。
傳統的逆嚮選擇模型建立在代理人“純粹自利”的假設基礎之上,忽略瞭人的公平心理偏好對激勵契約的影響。從箇體心理偏好的異質性齣髮,將作為隱藏信息的公平偏好心理因素嵌入傳統逆嚮選擇模型,設計齣噹代理人能力水平和心理偏好特徵均為私有信息時的最優契約,可以髮現公平偏好以及雙重逆嚮選擇的信息結構對于最優激勵契約及其實施效率的影響。結果錶明:雙重逆嚮選擇情形下最優契約是“部分混同”的,而公平心理會導緻部分代理人通過隱藏其真實心理偏好以穫取額外信息租金。最優契約是在信息租金抽取、公平心理補償與配置效率之間權衡產生的結果,因此與傳統的逆嚮選擇情形相比,公平偏好會導緻低能力代理人的配置嚮下扭麯變大,而不同能力代理人之間的收入差距會隨公平心理彊度增加而增大。
전통적역향선택모형건립재대리인“순수자리”적가설기출지상,홀략료인적공평심리편호대격려계약적영향。종개체심리편호적이질성출발,장작위은장신식적공평편호심리인소감입전통역향선택모형,설계출당대리인능력수평화심리편호특정균위사유신식시적최우계약,가이발현공평편호이급쌍중역향선택적신식결구대우최우격려계약급기실시효솔적영향。결과표명:쌍중역향선택정형하최우계약시“부분혼동”적,이공평심리회도치부분대리인통과은장기진실심리편호이획취액외신식조금。최우계약시재신식조금추취、공평심리보상여배치효솔지간권형산생적결과,인차여전통적역향선택정형상비,공평편호회도치저능력대리인적배치향하뉴곡변대,이불동능력대리인지간적수입차거회수공평심리강도증가이증대。
Traditional adverse selection model is based on the assumption of pure selfish agent,igno-ring the influence of peoples’fairness preferences on the incentive contract.In view of this,starting from the heterogeneous psychological preference of a person,embedding fairness preference as hiding information into the traditional adverse selection model,this paper designed the optimal contract of which the abilities and psychological preferences of agents both were private information,and then an-alyzed the influence of fairness preference and information structure of double adverse selection on the optimal contract and its implementation efficiency.The result shows that when the principal faces the double adverse selection,the optimal contract are partly pooling,and so fairness preference can make some agents get information rents by hiding their true psychological preference.The optimal contract is induced by a tradeoff between information rent,inequity premium fairness and efficiency.Thus fair-ness preference aggravates distortion of low-efficient agent’s production compared to the traditional ad-verse selection model and the income gap between different efficient agents is relative positively to the degree of fairness preference.