技术经济
技術經濟
기술경제
Technology Economics
2015年
10期
117-125
,共9页
市场竞争强度%管理层持股%股权激励%股利分配%股利政策
市場競爭彊度%管理層持股%股權激勵%股利分配%股利政策
시장경쟁강도%관리층지고%고권격려%고리분배%고리정책
market competition intensity%managerial ownership%equity incentive%dividend distribution%dividend policy
选取2009—2013年中国沪深两市1208家非金融类上市公司为样本,运用Tobit模型和Probit模型,实证检验了管理层持股比例对股利分配(股利分配的额度和倾向性)的治理效应。结果显示:中国上市公司管理层持股与股利分配的关系曲线呈倒U型,即在一定范围内,管理层持股比例越高,上市公司股利发放的倾向性和力度就越大;而管理层持股比例一旦超过某一临界值,管理层持股比例的增加反而会降低股利发放的倾向性和力度;市场竞争对管理层持股的治理效应产生显著影响,体现为当竞争程度相对较高时管理层持股比例越高,则上市公司股利分配的可能性和分配额度越高。
選取2009—2013年中國滬深兩市1208傢非金融類上市公司為樣本,運用Tobit模型和Probit模型,實證檢驗瞭管理層持股比例對股利分配(股利分配的額度和傾嚮性)的治理效應。結果顯示:中國上市公司管理層持股與股利分配的關繫麯線呈倒U型,即在一定範圍內,管理層持股比例越高,上市公司股利髮放的傾嚮性和力度就越大;而管理層持股比例一旦超過某一臨界值,管理層持股比例的增加反而會降低股利髮放的傾嚮性和力度;市場競爭對管理層持股的治理效應產生顯著影響,體現為噹競爭程度相對較高時管理層持股比例越高,則上市公司股利分配的可能性和分配額度越高。
선취2009—2013년중국호심량시1208가비금융류상시공사위양본,운용Tobit모형화Probit모형,실증검험료관리층지고비례대고리분배(고리분배적액도화경향성)적치리효응。결과현시:중국상시공사관리층지고여고리분배적관계곡선정도U형,즉재일정범위내,관리층지고비례월고,상시공사고리발방적경향성화력도취월대;이관리층지고비례일단초과모일림계치,관리층지고비례적증가반이회강저고리발방적경향성화력도;시장경쟁대관리층지고적치리효응산생현저영향,체현위당경쟁정도상대교고시관리층지고비례월고,칙상시공사고리분배적가능성화분배액도월고。
This paper selects an unbalanced panel data of 1208 Chinese non‐financial companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2013.Taking into consideration of the mechanism of external market competition ,it tests the effect of managerial ownership on the dividend dis‐tribution(including the quota and tendency) by applying the Tobit model and Probit model.The main evidences indicate as follows :there is an re‐lationship with inverted U‐shape between managerial ownership and dividend payment(or dividend policy) ,which means that ,in a certain range , the higher the management ownership ,the greater tendency and strength of dividend payment ;and once it exceeds a critical value ,its increase‐ment reduces the possibility and the quota of dividend distribution instead ;market competition has significant influences on the relationship be‐tween managerial ownership and dividend payment ,that is ,when market competition intensity increases ,the possibility and quota of dividend dis‐tribution increase with managerial ownership ;and vice versa .