西安交通大学学报(社会科学版)
西安交通大學學報(社會科學版)
서안교통대학학보(사회과학판)
Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University (Social Sciences)
2015年
5期
7-14
,共8页
集合融资%银行贷款%小微企业%自助担保%演化博弈
集閤融資%銀行貸款%小微企業%自助擔保%縯化博弈
집합융자%은행대관%소미기업%자조담보%연화박혁
collective financing%bank loan%small - and - micro - sized enterprises%self - guarantee%evolutionary game
基于所构建的商业银行与小微企业之间的集合融资演化博弈模型,以企业群体内部形成的自助担保机制为研究背景,分别对集合融资过程中有抵押资产和无抵押资产两种情形下的双方策略变化趋势进行了探讨。通过演化博弈分析认为,无抵押资产的集合融资贷款模式并没有增加银行的信用风险,且该模式不仅可以帮助银行降低贷款审查成本,拓宽中间业务渠道,还可以缓解小微企业信息不透明问题,防范企业违约风险的产生,同时降低企业获得资金的门槛,为解决小微企业的融资问题提供了新的思路。
基于所構建的商業銀行與小微企業之間的集閤融資縯化博弈模型,以企業群體內部形成的自助擔保機製為研究揹景,分彆對集閤融資過程中有牴押資產和無牴押資產兩種情形下的雙方策略變化趨勢進行瞭探討。通過縯化博弈分析認為,無牴押資產的集閤融資貸款模式併沒有增加銀行的信用風險,且該模式不僅可以幫助銀行降低貸款審查成本,拓寬中間業務渠道,還可以緩解小微企業信息不透明問題,防範企業違約風險的產生,同時降低企業穫得資金的門檻,為解決小微企業的融資問題提供瞭新的思路。
기우소구건적상업은행여소미기업지간적집합융자연화박혁모형,이기업군체내부형성적자조담보궤제위연구배경,분별대집합융자과정중유저압자산화무저압자산량충정형하적쌍방책략변화추세진행료탐토。통과연화박혁분석인위,무저압자산적집합융자대관모식병몰유증가은행적신용풍험,차해모식불부가이방조은행강저대관심사성본,탁관중간업무거도,환가이완해소미기업신식불투명문제,방범기업위약풍험적산생,동시강저기업획득자금적문함,위해결소미기업적융자문제제공료신적사로。
This paper establishes the evolutionary game model of collective financing between commercial banks and small -and -micro -sized enterprises.The investigations were conducted on the two parties′strategies trend in the dif-ferent cases which are secured loans and unsecured loans in the context of self -guarantee mechanism formed in enter-prises group.Through the game analysis,we conclude that the unsecured collective financing mode does not increase the credit risk of bank.The given mode can both reduce the cost of examination and expand the channels of middle business of commercial bank.For small -and -micro -sized enterprises,it will not only mitigate the problem of information o-pacity,but also prevent the enterprises default risk.Furthermore,this approach lowers the financing threshold and gives a new way of thinking to solve the financing problems of small -and -micro -sized enterprises.