CAJ | 학술논문

运用演化博弈理论构建了森林旅游企业环境行为的演化博弈模型，指出政府进行环境监管的概率与成本、对森林旅游企业实施的惩罚、森林旅游企业因实施环境行为为自身带来的收益及所花费的成本是影响森林旅游企业环境行为演化的主要因素，并在此基础上提出了加大政府政策扶持、建立森林旅游生态补偿机制、完善森林旅游环境监管体制、制定合理的奖罚制度等促进森林旅游企业实施环境行为的政策建议。
운용연화박혁이론구건료삼림여유기업배경행위적연화박혁모형，지출정부진행배경감관적개솔여성본、대삼림여유기업실시적징벌、삼림여유기업인실시배경행위위자신대래적수익급소화비적성본시영향삼림여유기업배경행위연화적주요인소，병재차기출상제출료가대정부정책부지、건립삼림여유생태보상궤제、완선삼림여유배경감관체제、제정합리적장벌제도등촉진삼림여유기업실시배경행위적정책건의。
Using evolutionary game theory, this article constructs evolutionary game model of environ￣mental behavior of forest tourism enterprises, notes that the probability and cost of government environ￣mental regulation, penalties on the forest tourism enterprises, benefits and cost due to the implemen￣tation of environmental behavior are the factors in influencing the environmental behavior evolution of forest tourism enterprises. Based on this, this article puts forward the suggestions for promoting the en￣vironmental behavior of forest tourism enterprises such as increasing government policy support, estab￣lishing ecological compensation mechanism of forest tourism, perfecting the supervision system of forest tourist environment, formulating a reasonable system of reward and punishment and so on.