CAJ | 학술논문

家族企业的治理效率一直受到广泛关注。家族治理通过何种渠道影响企业业绩？本文以2010～2012年上市家族企业为研究样本，研究家族治理通过专用性投资对企业业绩的影响。实证结果表明：家族企业中专用性投资具有较高的代理成本，对企业业绩产生负面影响。家族治理中的家族所有权和业主权威降低了专用性投资水平，两权分离度提高了专用性投资水平。研究还发现，更高的家族所有权能够显著削弱专用性投资对企业业绩带来的负面影响。本文完善了家族治理、财务行为与企业业绩的互动链条。
가족기업적치리효솔일직수도엄범관주。가족치리통과하충거도영향기업업적？본문이2010～2012년상시가족기업위연구양본，연구가족치리통과전용성투자대기업업적적영향。실증결과표명：가족기업중전용성투자구유교고적대리성본，대기업업적산생부면영향。가족치리중적가족소유권화업주권위강저료전용성투자수평，량권분리도제고료전용성투자수평。연구환발현，경고적가족소유권능구현저삭약전용성투자대기업업적대래적부면영향。본문완선료가족치리、재무행위여기업업적적호동련조。
The governance efficiency of family enterprises has been widely concerned. Through what channel does family governance affect enterprise value ? Based on a sample of 2010-2012 listed family companies, we study the impact of family governance through specific investment on corporate performance. The empirical results show that, specific investment in family enterprises with high agency costs has a negative influence on enterprise value. Family ownership and landlord authority reduce the specific investment level, and two rights separation degree increases the specific investment level. Our study also finds that higher levels of family ownership can significantly weaken specific investment’s negative influences on enterprise value. This paper improves the interaction chain among family governance, financial behavior and enterprise value.