CAJ | 학술논문

针对单向激励下,由于业主和承包商之间信息不对称引发的单边逆向选择或单边道德风险,从而导致建设工程质量优化目标协调不一致的问题,从相关者利益最大化角度出发,构建了双向激励下建设工程质量优化的计算实验模型,设计了不同激励力度、努力水平及成本共担比例下的多种实验情景,通过计算实验得到了工程质量、承包商行为等的演化结果,分析发现:采用双向激励,在成本分担比例、激励力度、努力水平满足一定条件时,能调动业主加大激励力度、承包商提高努力水平的积极性,有利于实现业主与承包商双方的合作共赢.
침대단향격려하,유우업주화승포상지간신식불대칭인발적단변역향선택혹단변도덕풍험,종이도치건설공정질량우화목표협조불일치적문제,종상관자이익최대화각도출발,구건료쌍향격려하건설공정질량우화적계산실험모형,설계료불동격려력도、노력수평급성본공담비례하적다충실험정경,통과계산실험득도료공정질량、승포상행위등적연화결과,분석발현:채용쌍향격려,재성본분담비례、격려력도、노력수평만족일정조건시,능조동업주가대격려력도、승포상제고노력수평적적겁성,유리우실현업주여승포상쌍방적합작공영.
For the excitations,the asymmetric information of unilateral adverse selection or unilateral moral risk leads to the inconsistency problem of the target coordinate construction engineering quality optimization. From the maximization perspective of stakeholders wealth,constructing the cost sharing of the owners and contractors of bi-directional incentive model on computational experiment,designing different the incentive intensity and different effort levels under bi-directional incentive experiment scene, using computational experiments to investigate the effect of engineering quality optimization and contractors behavior. The analysis found that:using bi-directional incentive,in the cost sharing proportion,incentives,effort level satisfy certain condition,to mobilize the enthusiasm of the owners can increase incentives,and the contractors will improve the enthusiasm of effort level. Also they realize the cooperation a win-win situation. At the same time invisible reputation incentive is helpful to enhance the quality of the project,so we should be paid attention to it in the management process.