CAJ | 학술논문

我国的国有控股上市公司是由计划经济体制下的生产经营单位转化而来的商业实体，因此有着产权结构复杂以及目标多重性等特征。基于这些特征，我国国有控股上市公司治理中就面临着更加复杂的委托代理问题，如何均衡各个经营主体经营目标之间的利益矛盾，如何更好地处理以政府为代表的大股东与经营者、大股东和小股东之间的关系就成为了我国国有控股上市公司共同面临的治理困境。文章利用委托代理理论从根源上来分析和解读国有控股上市公司在治理机制上面临的问题，为优化国有控股上市公司治理机制提供思路。
아국적국유공고상시공사시유계화경제체제하적생산경영단위전화이래적상업실체，인차유착산권결구복잡이급목표다중성등특정。기우저사특정，아국국유공고상시공사치리중취면림착경가복잡적위탁대리문제，여하균형각개경영주체경영목표지간적이익모순，여하경호지처리이정부위대표적대고동여경영자、대고동화소고동지간적관계취성위료아국국유공고상시공사공동면림적치리곤경。문장이용위탁대리이론종근원상래분석화해독국유공고상시공사재치리궤제상면림적문제，위우화국유공고상시공사치리궤제제공사로。
State-owned corporation is the business entities that transferred from the production under the planned economic system, therefore characterized the complex property right structure and multiple targets. Based on these characteristics, the state-owned listed company is faced with more complex principal-agent problem. The governance dilemma of our state-owned listed company is how to balance the how to balance the conflicts of interest between each main body of management objectives, how to better handle the relationship between large shareholders and managers, and how to handle with the relationship between the government as the representative of the large shareholders and small. In this paper, using the principal-agent theory to analyze and interpret the state-owned listing Corporation faces in the governance mechanism on the root causes of problems, and provide new ideas for optimizing the state-owned listed corporation's governance mechanism.