CAJ | 학술논문

基于基金经理人相对业绩激励机制研究，构造了一个包含有三个彼此竞争的基金经理人理论模型，分析了在相对业绩激励契约下其投资行为的特征。结果表明：基金经理人相对业绩激励契约在一定条件下会造成投资决策的扭曲，不仅会造成“羊群效应”，在某些时候还会促成非常规的冒险投资决策；应加快构建科学合理的基金经理人评价体系，为基金业健康长远发展提供更好的外部环境。
기우기금경리인상대업적격려궤제연구，구조료일개포함유삼개피차경쟁적기금경리인이론모형，분석료재상대업적격려계약하기투자행위적특정。결과표명：기금경리인상대업적격려계약재일정조건하회조성투자결책적뉴곡，불부회조성“양군효응”，재모사시후환회촉성비상규적모험투자결책；응가쾌구건과학합리적기금경리인평개체계，위기금업건강장원발전제공경호적외부배경。
Based on the studies of fund manager’s relative performance merchanism, this paper builds a model containing three competitive fund managers to study fund manager’s incentives on relative performance contracts, and recognizes that special relative performance contracts may cause unconventional investment decision or“herd behavior”. It suggests that the goverment should speed up the construction of scientific and reasonable evaluation system of fond managers, and provide a better external environment for the long-term development of the fund industry.