CAJ | 학술논문

通过构建由国有企业及私有企业组成的混合双寡头垄断模型，研究交叉所有权与国有股最优比重之间的相互作用。研究发现：交叉所有权与政府的国有股比重决策具有相互作用，共同对社会福利产生影响；只有在国有股比重足够低的情况下，交叉所有权安排对私有企业才是有利可图的；在均衡状态下，不存在私有企业对国有企业的交叉所有权安排；在国有企业与私有企业效率差距超过一定水平的情况下，交叉所有权安排存在的可能性对国有股最优比重产生影响。
통과구건유국유기업급사유기업조성적혼합쌍과두롱단모형，연구교차소유권여국유고최우비중지간적상호작용。연구발현：교차소유권여정부적국유고비중결책구유상호작용，공동대사회복리산생영향；지유재국유고비중족구저적정황하，교차소유권안배대사유기업재시유리가도적；재균형상태하，불존재사유기업대국유기업적교차소유권안배；재국유기업여사유기업효솔차거초과일정수평적정황하，교차소유권안배존재적가능성대국유고최우비중산생영향。
This paper constructs a mixed duopoly model composed by the state-owned enterprise and private enterprise, and the effects of cross-ownership on optimal nationalization, and vice-versa, in mixed duopoly. Result shows that cross-owner-ship and the proportion of state-owned shares influence each other and the social welfare. Cross-ownership is profitable to the private firm only when the level of nationalization of the public firm is sufficiently low. In equilibrium, cross-ownership does not take place. The cross-ownership influences the optimal level of nationalization, if the efficiency gap between the two firms is larger than a critical level.